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Authenticity in the Late
Modern Era
Anxieties about species extinction, habitat loss, and climate change
attributed to the uninhibited commodification of nature—the
“massive anthropogenic erosion of biodiversity”—are a theme of our
times, marking the Anthropocene.1 Some of the most acute and se-
vere expressions of ecological guilt and “endangerment sensibilities,”
expressed in the media and the social and cultural sciences alike, re-
volve around the waning of “wild” fauna, flora, and landscapes as a
consequence of commodification.2 Indeed, much of the public con-
cern at present centers on the dramatic decrease of wildlife popula-
tions as a result of the wildlife trade—the dwindling of elephant and
lion populations by some 58 percent between 1970 and 2014 alone,
for instance, or the extinction of certain rhino subspecies and other
charismatic megafauna at the hands of poachers and trophy hunters.3
Though scientists adduce other causes for the decline, including habi-
tat loss and climate change, public debate frequently revolves around
the incompatibility of capitalist markets and what stands as their con-
ceptual opposite in the public imagination: a wild, unfallen natural
world that is the last refuge both of nature and human innocence.4
This forum is concerned with the modern history of the fraught re-
lationship between commodification and the wild. Contributions to
the forum explore the impact of market relations on wild fauna and
flora—plants and animals customarily conceptualized in opposition
to domesticated, captively raised, or cultivated organisms.5
Contributors examine the consumptive use of seahorses, caoutchouc,
elephant tusks, cinchona bark, rhinoceroses, and grizzly bears as mal-
leable raw materials, gourmet delicacies, or extraordinary medicines.
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The wild has long been a source and measure of physical health and a
place for trophy hunting, musealization, and tourism—namely, for
communing with the authentic. It has, in short, long been a con-
sumer good.6 The particular concern of the forum is with the socio-
ecological anxieties that have resulted from the expansion of market
relations of monetary exchange to wild organisms since the early
1800s. The articles are concerned both with ecological misgivings
about alterations in the distribution and abundance of species and
with worries about these species’ loss of authenticity or wildness—
that is, with the processes of acculturation or domestication often
entailed by commodification.
Chronologically, the forum centers on the centuries spanning from
the early nineteenth century to the present, a time in which human
beings are generally thought to have become a major biogeochemical
force. Indeed, the late modern era is often associated with a hubristic
faith in the human ability to alter the natural world, while denying
or belittling the degree to which humanity is altered, shaped, and
entrapped by it.7 The contributions to the forum are interested pre-
cisely in that hubris and the resulting lamentation of the supposed
ability of humans to single-handedly manage, control, and alter the
natural world beyond recognition. The nineteenth century not only
saw the advent of that hubris, but it also saw the concomitant (and
consequent) rise of ecological anxieties in relation to the wild contri-
butions with which this forum is concerned.8 For it was in the early
nineteenth century that humans were first confronted with almost ir-
refutable evidence for the reality of extinction, long after they had
apprehended that changes to nature could be anthropogenic.9 It was
also during the nineteenth century that concern for the environment
in the modern sense—that is, discourse about the necessity of allow-
ing diverse living things and habitats to coexist with humanity—first
emerged and, with it, practices of conservation and nature protec-
tion.10 Most importantly, perhaps, it was over the long nineteenth
century, especially in its second half, that “wilderness,” in a dramatic
shift of values, ceased to be a deserted, desolate, barren place where
one came only against one’s will in fear and was remade in the image
of the “romantic sublime,” becoming a place of civilizational
longing—of the pristine, moral, and sacred.11 With it, wilderness be-
came a site that, rather than endangering humans, was endangered
by them. Wild nature came to be conceptualized in opposition to,
and remote from, humanity, capitalism, and civilization; in the mid-
nineteenth century, it became the one place “where,” as William
Cronon phrased it, “symbolically at least, we try to withhold our
power to dominate.”12 Human interference with the wild has carried
both a peculiar fascination and the association of inherent wrongful-
ness ever since.
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Along those lines, the contributions to this forum are indebted to a
wide range of mostly North American scholarship on the “received
wilderness idea” since the nineteenth century that has long exposed
wilderness as “a matter of perception—part of the geography of the
mind.”13 Some of that scholarship has also discussed the relationship
between wilderness and capitalism; the alienation from nature that
industrial capitalism produced and the concomitant ideas about wil-
derness as a sanctuary and as mankind’s best hope of salvation from
it.14 The ideal of wilderness rendered the wild a valuable commodity,
one that possessed “an economic value” and one that could be
bought and sold as trophies and live capture or as experience and
spectacle, consumed on the very premises.15 It also entailed, as histor-
ians of North America and the British Empire, in particular, have ar-
gued, concerns about wild nature’s vulnerability in the face of
modern technology, capitalism, and trade from early on—anxieties
about the possibility of anthropogenic changes and extinction and
ensuing discourses and practices of conservation, nature protection,
and environmentalism.16 Indeed, though critiques of the expansion
of market-based monetary exchange in social life more broadly are a
common theme across the history of Western intellectual thought
and far beyond, these censures are rarely as poignant as when market
relations override, and defy, the purported inviolacy of wilderness or
its late modern surrogate, biodiversity—a seemingly more scientific
concept that does perpetuate, however, as scholars have argued, the
same values of artlessness, integrity, and numinousness.17
The contributions to this forum not only shift the focus to percep-
tions of nature at its most wronged and its most profoundly threat-
ened, but they also study sites often associated with the wild in the
Western imagination (southwestern and eastern Africa, the
Himalayan and Andean highlands, the American West, and the
Amazon rainforest), and, thus, they bring new insights to the field.
Though various historians have studied the cultural and cognitive
processes in which elements of nature more broadly are marked as
commodities, accounted for, and placed in patterns of exchange,
much of the literature on wilderness, environmentalism, and capital-
ism is focused on modern North America and Europe.18 This forum,
in contrast, brings studies on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
and on Anglo-American ideas of wilderness, together with contribu-
tions by anthropologists, early modernists, and linguists examining
the non-English speaking world to reveal the idiosyncrasies of the
modern Anglo-American tradition and to uncover both continuity
and change over time in the ways in which humans categorize
aspects of the natural world and assess their own ability to affect or al-
ter it. With their global comparative approaches, the contributions
lead us to question, or add nuance to, established chronologies—of
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the worldwide circulation of the ideal of wilderness or of anxieties
about extinction—in global environmental history.
The articles that follow also underscore the relevance of the partic-
ular affordances of ivory, grizzlies, or seahorses in this variation, a
question hitherto neglected in many histories and anthropologies of
natural resources, and the importance of wild things’ peculiar mate-
rial, reproductive, or behavioral properties in determining the range
of their appeal, targets for their charisma, or vulnerability to extinc-
tion.19 Most importantly, however, the contributions highlight the
variety and longevity of vernaculars and the differences in how socie-
ties relate to their surroundings. They present views of nature that do
not distinguish between domesticated and wild; discuss ideas about
the wild that are not romantic; highlight efforts at conservation that
are not at odds with commodification; study anxieties about extinc-
tion that are not ecological; and examine understandings of wild na-
ture that do not exclude humankind—understandings that are “rich
in relationships as well as in species.”
Stefanie G€anger is professor of modern history at the University of
Heidelberg. Stefanie’s work considers the histories of science and medicine
in late colonial and early Republican Spanish America as well as in the
wider world.
Michael Bollig is professor of social and cultural anthropology at the
University of Cologne. Michael’s work currently focuses on the social and
economic ramifications of conservation in the savannahs of eastern and
southern Africa in the context of global environmental governance. He is
particularly interested in historical continuities and discontinuities of
human–livestock–wildlife interactions.
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The most “injurious abuse” the harvesters were culpable of, wrote
Francisco Jose de Caldas (1768–1816) in his 1808 memorandum on
the state of the cinchona trees, was that of removing the trees’ bark
by means of “barbarous” and “destructive” techniques that caused
them to wither and die. The harvesters were entirely “careless about
the future” of the tree populations, he lamented. Indeed, one could
find but “with great difficulty” a “wild (silvestre)” cinchona sapling in
the Cordillera Real, “the great jungles and forests” that, for over a
century, had supplied “all the Kingdoms of the World” with that pre-
cious and valued medicinal substance.1 “Many of the harvesters,”
Caldas grieved,
“excorticate the tree, break the branches in the most rustic
and gross manner [to] take the bark and [thereby] render
that individual unusable forever, for, thus mistreated, it inev-
itably dries up. Others the first thing they do is to fell the
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tree at the base, a mindless practice, though less detrimental
than the previous one. The stump,” he continued,
“regenerates into two, three or sometimes, five sprouts. It is
to this beneficial natural regeneration that we owe the trees
that provide his Majesty, and our pharmacies [with the
bark]. Without it, they might perhaps [already] have
extinguished the species.”2
We tend to associate unsustainable harvest practices, the overex-
ploitation of vegetable raw materials, as well as anxieties about spe-
cies extinction with the late modern era. As historians have argued
for some time now, however, at least some Prussian, French, and, it
would seem, Spanish and Spanish American naturalists of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century were already debating not
only the possibility of alterations in the distribution and abundance
of vegetation but also that of plant species, in particular, as a result of
the economic practices of exploitation and extraction.3 As a matter of
fact, by the time Caldas invoked the specter of the extinction of cin-
chona as a species, the very possibility of species loss and
extinction—the conception that the world of plants was fragmented
into a series of discrete, fixed, and stable ontic unities that could ap-
pear or vanish forever—had just arisen.4 Caldas’s lament over the
impending danger of deforestation, the wild cinchonas’ scarcity, and
conceivable extinction, as a consequence of their commodification,
was not only in some measure still unconventional and controversial
but also philosophically and religiously troubling.5 More impor-
tantly, the weight and meaning of these processes was as yet unfixed,
unsettled, and debatable. This article sketches the grounds, and the
epistemic contours of the environmental anxiety—the specter of the
wild cinchona tree’s anthropogenic rarity and closeness to
extinction—that Caldas conjured in Andean South America in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It reassembles the
scale and dynamics of forest loss driven by the cinchonas’ commodi-
fication and seeks to situate, and read, the construal of these observ-
able consequences in the period’s lexis, categories of thought, and
order of knowledge.
***
Caldas was an exceptionally well-connected and well-travelled
man. He worked as a peddler in the Andes before training as a bota-
nist and scientist with Jose Celestino Mutis (1732–1808), Alexander
von Humboldt (1769–1859), and Aime Bonpland (1773–1858). His
observation that the harvesting practices adopted by bark cutters
were destructive—that carelessness, greed, and ignorance were to be
blamed for the trees’ destruction—echoed what was conventional
wisdom at the time in the principal bark-growing regions in the
Quito Audiencia, then part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Bark
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cutters—“Indians,” in the majority—did indeed either fell the trees
directly or decorticate the entire trunk of cinchona trees to be able to
excorticate more conveniently, and those practices did, as another
contemporary phrased it, “cripple the [tree] forever” and almost inev-
itably caused it to dry up, wither, and die. But a very small minority
of trees, “those that had escaped standing, and with some part of
their bark,” survived a first harvest to regrow a second layer of bark.6
Thousands of trees withered and died, presumably as a conse-
quence of destructive harvesting practices intended to satisfy demand
across the Atlantic world. By the late 1700s and early 1800s, the bark
of the cinchona tree, which prospered only on the precipitous, east-
ern slopes of the Andes at the time, was one of the Spanish Empire’s
most coveted and profitable export products, and some 400 tons of
that material left South American ports every year.7 A widely cele-
brated febrifuge and universal remedy, the knowledge of which, so it
was said, had come to mankind from its simplest, and humblest,
specimens—“wild Indians” close to nature and privy to its most cov-
eted secrets—cinchona was in popular demand in societies from
Scotland to the Bosporus and from the Italian peninsula to Illinois.8
According to contemporaries, a thirty- to forty-year-old cinchona tree
yielded around forty to fifty kilograms of bark; a younger one—say,
five or six years old—only some six kilograms.9 Calculating with these
upper and lower bounds, the harvesting of 400 tons would have occa-
sioned the destruction of between eight thousand and seventy thou-
sand trees per annum. These figures apparently escalated at times,
owing to changing consumer tastes and fashions. Miguel Garcıa
Caceres, the governor of the Jaen de Bracamoros gobierno, lamented
in 1785 that the current preference for fine, thin bark in commerce
was to be held accountable for excessive tree mortality. With a robust,
regular-sized tree yielding on average some five libras of thin bark,
Garcıa Caceres calculated that it was “necessary to fell one hundred
thousand large trees to collect twenty thousand arrobas of thin (fina)
cinchona,” some 230 tons. If thick bark, or crust, were also used, it
would “only have required thirty-four thousand trees,” and it would
not have been necessary, Garcıa Caceres grieved, “to miserably de-
stroy sixty-six thousand just to satisfy the whim of the merchants of
Europe.”10 Not only were tens of thousands of cinchona trees
destroyed every year; close observers soon apprehended that the re-
covery of tree populations—the “natural regeneration” that Caldas
pinned his hopes on—might be slower than anticipated. As Pedro
Xavier de Valdivieso y Torre, the governor of Loja, warned already in
1779, one was not to expect a tree to mature “in the short period of
two or three years,” as did some of his contemporaries, or even to
“yield marketable bark (se sazona su corteza)” in five or six years.
Rather, according to his observations, it took saplings more than two
decades to become full-grown trees.11
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While cinchona forests had long been believed to be vast, “dense
and extensive,” particularly from the mid-nineteenth century, colo-
nial officials, bark merchants, and harvesters in the central and north-
ern Andes began to observe, and express unease about, “much
diminution” in the tree populations.12 A sense of endangerment and
impending scarcity increasingly settled in over the later eighteenth
century, a veritable gold rush, when hundreds of bark cutters,
responding to high market demand and exorbitant prices, went into
the bark-growing regions and often brought back hundreds of kilo-
grams each in one season. Already by the 1760s, contemporaries
noted the depletion of some particular mountain slopes. Harvest
workers complained about the ever greater difficulty involved in
searching for the bark “in the roughness of the hills.” They often
spent many days in the forests without discovering a single cinchona
tree, they consistently declared, because the hills had been “lumbered
and destroyed entirely.”13 By the late 1770s and early 1780s, there
were still some merchants, landowners, and officials who claimed
that cinchona supplies were “abundant” and that the hills were
“inexhaustible.” However, an awareness of the vulnerability, scarcity,
and fragility of cinchona tree populations had already come to super-
sede and supplant the earlier vision of a land of plenty in official, as
well as in popular, discourse.14 Too notorious was the “decline of the
hills where the fine cinchona grows,” as a group of prominent Loja
residents phrased it in 1782, “owing to the quantities that had been
extracted from them.”15 By 1788, all investigations pointed toward
the same direction: the “near annihilation” of all of the cinchona for-
ests of Loja.16 In 1809, preoccupation with scarcity had developed
into a sense of urgency and finality, intense enough for Caldas to
evoke even the specter of extinction. Within some sixteen to twenty
square leguas—some 67.2 to eighty-four square kilometers—of Loja,
Caldas intimated, there was now hardly a “single [cinchona] tree.”17
Caldas himself was involved in the search for new cinchona harvest
areas, the chief measure pursued by the Crown and merchants in re-
sponse to the threat of cinchona extinction. By the late 1700s and
early 1800s, there was considerable controversy both over the bound-
ary and confines of cinchona vis-a-vis other plants and over the varie-
ties “cinchona” was to encompass. There was, accordingly, also great
disagreement, and dispute, about the extension of the tree’s natural
habitat.18 Bark cutting moved from the original harvest areas to other
sites in the Viceroyalties of New Granada and Peru, but often only un-
til misgivings about the “virtue,” identity, or efficacy of the bark in
the new sites discredited their viability.19 Variations in how
contemporaries evaluated the urgency of scarcity, and the possibility
of extinction, closely correlated with uncertainty about the confines,
solidity, and definiteness of the species as well as its potential areas of
growth. As elsewhere in Spanish America around 1800, the vastness
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of the poorly explored territory, where supposedly extinct species
might still be found undetected, was a key argument against the real-
ity of extinction.20 To Caldas and his contemporaries, extinction was
thus still a distant and uncertain possibility, but it was a possibility
nonetheless.
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw both the ad-
vent of the modernist faith in the human ability to alter the natural
world and the rise of socio-ecological anxieties about it. Concerns
with man-made deforestation, destruction, and extinction, which
contrasted with earlier views about the general “beneficence of hu-
man activity in environmental terms,” evidently resonated in the
learned, creole circles of the Viceroyalty of New Granada.21 Caldas’s
reading of species rarity, vanishing, and anthropogenic extinction
was, like that of most of his contemporaries, not ecological. To him,
these alterations did not yet constitute a wanton, potentially cata-
strophic, violation of a requisite natural equilibrium among constitu-
ent species or of the forest as a guarantor of climatic stability.22 Nor
was his concern romantic, as in a learned, sublime lament over injury
to a preferably wild and undisturbed nature.23 Such interpretations,
though increasingly available in contemporary thought, were still a
minority discourse, not yet so compelling as to make them manda-
tory for Spanish American observers—even someone like Caldas, who
quite possibly was aware of them—to subscribe to them.24 Indeed,
Caldas was one of the most outspoken supporters of a cinchona plan-
tation system, clearly having no qualms about wild cinchonas be-
coming cultivated organisms or dislocating a jigsaw piece in nature’s
even balance.25 Rather, Caldas’s and his contemporaries’ lamentation
of the cinchonas’ closeness to extinction was primarily utilitarian, on
account of its removing a source of income for the harvest areas’
“wretched inhabitants,” occasioning the shortage of a “highly useful
medicine,” and entailing a loss of tax revenue for the Royal
Treasury.26 So was that of Indian bark cutters, who lamented the
bark’s scarcity principally because it made their forays a less profit-
able, protracted, and more hazardous business that forced them into
unfamiliar, rough terrain where they risked accident, starvation, and
sickness.27 But, while their and Caldas’s reading of deforestation was
quite conventional in its pragmatism—apprehensions about defores-
tation as resource loss through exploitation, misguided stewardship,
or happenstance had a long history in the Iberian world and
beyond—it was not so in the sense of urgency, possible irrevocability,
and finality that had made a foray into their concerns, through the
notion of extinction.28
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries not only produced in
some measure wilderness, rarity, and extinction as categories, but
they also saw them accrue their peculiar, modern meaning, value,
and associations.29 Caldas’s lamentation over the impending danger
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of the wild cinchonas’ scarcity, and conceivable extinction, as a con-
sequence of their commodification, marks a key moment in environ-
mental history: the beginning, and worldwide dissemination, of
modern endangerment sensibility, a sense of ecological urgency, fa-
tality, and impending loss.30 Historians have argued for some time
now that eighteenth-century science in the Iberian world was much
more consonant, and interwoven with, its northern counterpart than
has hitherto been assumed and that Europeans and Spanish
Americans partook of many of the same naturalist discourses and cat-
egories.31 Spanish officials’, Creole merchants’, and Indian bark cut-
ters’ awareness of, and preoccupation with, the loss and extinction of
a wild species, on account of the economic practices of extraction
and exploitation, was one such instance. By the late 1700s and early
1800s, the damage done by the commodification of wild plants had
just begun to seem calculable to them, as to many others, and, with
it, immeasurable.
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Timothy James LeCain
The Consumption of
Humans: How the Danger of
Grizzly Bear Attacks in
American National Parks
Became a Commodity
When scholars think about the commodification of wild nature,
they typically assume that whatever the commodity in question, it is
we humans who will be consuming it. But, in the case of the grizzly
bears living in American national parks, a very different form of com-
modification and consumption began to emerge in the late 1960s. In
the big northwestern parks like Yellowstone and Glacier where size-
able populations of wild grizzly bears (Ursus arctos horribilis) remain, a
growing number of park visitors sought to consume an experience
that had become a rare and strangely reassuring commodity: the sta-
tistically remote, but nonetheless entirely real, possibility that they
themselves might literally be attacked and (even more rarely) con-
sumed by a wild animal.
Just a century ago, of course, most Euro-American settlers would
have found it nearly incomprehensible that humans would value and
even seek to preserve the risk of a wild bear attack. As one pair of
authors put it in their 1973 discussion of the African crocodile, more
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typically “civilized man will not tolerate wild beasts that eat his chil-
dren, his cattle, or even the fish he deems to be his.”1 Indeed, Euro-
American settlers typically saw the grizzly and other bears as the
antithesis of the human and, thus, a useful means of contrasting their
own supposedly more civilized state with the natural wildness of the
“beast.” Not only did the grizzly bear sometimes kill and eat the set-
tlers’ precious stocks of domesticated animals, but they also occasion-
ally killed and sometimes ate the settlers themselves. Once settlers
gained a measure of control over the valleys and neighboring forests,
the grizzlies retreated deeper into the mountains, eager to avoid con-
flict with trigger-happy Americans. Yet their continued presence pro-
vided westerners with their first way to commodify the grizzly: by
selling the increasingly ritualized experience of hunting down and
killing the animals. To be sure, the bodily parts of the grizzly bear
itself—most especially, a carefully prepared hide or a mounted
head—became valuable commodities in their own right. Yet, even at
this early stage, it was clear that grizzly bear hunters were also seeking
what contemporary economists have termed an “experiential
commodity.”2 Here, the affective experience of hunting the bear was
as important, and perhaps even more important, than the material
commodities extracted from a dead bear’s body. Some believed that
the experience of hunting and killing a creature that at least in theory
might hunt and kill them would reinvigorate what they feared was a
flagging masculinity. In reality, the risks were carefully managed; few
bears stood much of a chance against the deadly long-distance accu-
racy of modern rifles. Reports from the first Euro-American visitors to
the Yellowstone area suggest that the animals were common and eas-
ily hunted. But, during the 1870s, hunters quickly reduced the once
vibrant population to an isolated remnant.3
With the arrival of regular rail passenger service to Yellowstone in
1883, the railroad companies, which also provided hotels and other
tourist services in the park, were anxious to present (and profit from)
the experience as one that was simultaneously authentic and safe for
the whole family.4 Perhaps not coincidentally, the hunting of griz-
zlies and all other wildlife within the park boundaries was also pro-
hibited that year.5 Tourists increasingly did not want the bears and
other wild animals killed and removed; rather, they wanted a way to
experience a bit of wild nature without too much effort or risk. To ca-
ter to this lucrative market for a new experiential commodity, first,
concessionaires and, eventually, the park service itself deliberately be-
gan to feed the bears left over food and garbage from the hotels.
Eating under cute signs like “Lunch Counter for Bears Only,” dozens
of mostly grizzly bears became the unwitting stars of nightly shows
that tourists could watch from grandstands. Rangers stood by with
rifles should any of the bears become a threat, but with ample free
food to be consumed, the grizzlies had little interest in making a meal
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of their audience. By the 1920s, the railroads and hotels frequently
promoted the park with ads that depicted the generally more pacific
black bears (Ursus americanus) as cute and friendly, human-like crea-
tures who would stand on their hind legs and beg for handouts.
Technically, it was illegal for tourists to feed either grizzlies or black
bears after 1902, but park officials often did little to discourage the
practice. Horace Albright, the Yellowstone park superintendent from
1919 to 1929, believed not unreasonably that the chance for such
close encounters with the bears attracted tourists and increased popu-
lar support for the park.6 These seemingly tame and friendly creatures
suggested a sort of “Peaceable Kingdom” model of experiential com-
modification, one in which tourists with adequate financial resources
could visit a place where humans and bears—and, by extension,
humans and nature more broadly—seemingly lived in harmony.
In the post-World War II era, however, park administrators, biolo-
gists, and a growing number of visitors began to question the
Peaceable Kingdom approach. Reflecting changing ideas about the
concept and value of wilderness, many park officials came to believe
that the grizzly bears who visited the park’s garbage dumps were be-
ing made comical, degraded, and, perhaps most importantly, unnatu-
ral. As the authors of one recent report put it, the park sought instead
to re-wild the “grizzly bears as awe-inspiring symbols of power and
wildness, rather than conjuring images of Yogi bear attempting to
steal picnic baskets from Jellystone Park.”7 By the postwar period,
considerable evidence had also accumulated that close interactions
between people and bears were risky to both. The Peaceable Kingdom
had always been something of an illusion, as park officials had fre-
quently intervened by shooting bears that crossed some ill-defined
boundary beyond which they were perceived as dangerous or a nui-
sance. Some wildlife biologists also began to argue that the behavior
of bears that harmed property or humans was not just unfortunate
but also unnatural, a consequence of their habituation to people that
undermined what would otherwise have been supposedly instinctual
fear.8 Precisely why the ability of some bears to tolerate and benefit
from human actions should be deemed unnatural or degraded was
not always clear. Indeed, the entirely natural ability of some bears to
better tolerate the proximity of humans was probably a useful sur-
vival strategy that allowed them to avoid dangerous battles with
other more dominant bears that sought to monopolize backcountry
food sources.9 But most biologists and administrators seemed to find
it self-evident that a bear was wild in inverse proportion to its contact
with, and acceptance of, humans. Increasingly, park officials valo-
rized the grizzly bear’s lesser tolerance for human habituation in com-
parison to the more adaptable black bear as one of their most
attractive traits. As one 1990 study asserted, the grizzly simply
“cannot adapt to the domestication of its habitat,” thus making it a
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superior emblem of “the power, uncertainty and challenge of wild
places.”10
Seeking to recreate what the historian Alice Wondrak Biel terms the
“Wilderness Bear,” Yellowstone administrators began to close the
grizzly garbage dumps and actively discourage roadside feeding of
black bears.11 In the 1960s, when growing numbers of visitors began
to venture into the backcountry, these efforts to limit close human–
bear interactions came to be seen as all the more important. In
Glacier National Park in far northern Montana, the increase in back-
country campers combined with the careless handling of food and
garbage created a dangerous situation. On a single night in August
1967, two different grizzlies killed two women in separate incidents.
It was later revealed that employees at Granite Park Chalet, where
one of the attacks occurred in a nearby campground, had still been
setting out table scraps that generated evening bear visits popular
with the tourists.12 The park service responded to the killings with
strengthened regulations for managing garbage (pack-it-in, pack-it-
out and bear-proof garbage cans), storing food, closing trails, and
dealing with bears thought to be excessively dangerous.13 Indeed, re-
gardless of whether or not the bears habituated to human feeding
were really acting unnaturally, the evidence suggested that the elimi-
nation of anthropogenic food sources helped to reduce violent
encounters.14 True, the numbers of grizzlies initially plummeted fol-
lowing the closing of the garbage dumps, contributing to their listing
as an endangered species in 1975. But, by the turn of the millennium,
the populations in both Glacier and Yellowstone had largely recov-
ered, confirming the wisdom of the Wilderness Bear management
model, at least from a biological perspective.15
Out of this complex confluence of human and non-human histo-
ries emerged the latest and perhaps most intangible way that the griz-
zly bear has been both protected and commodified. Whereas the
Peaceable Kingdom model had provided the tourist with a valuable
opportunity to see and even interact with grizzlies and black bears up
close, the new commodity in the Wilderness Bear model was some-
thing much more ineffable: an affective experience that derived from
knowing that the bear was out there, even if rarely seen, and, thus,
the remote but still genuine chance that the grizzly might actually at-
tack and (even more rarely) partially consume the visitor. Some hint
of this new experiential commodity was already apparent in 1968
when a sow with her cub attacked a schoolteacher and naturalist
named Robert Hahn in Glacier. Unlike the two women killed the pre-
vious year, Hahn survived the attack, and, from his hospital bed, he
issued a telling plea: that the sow that had attacked him not be killed.
“It was my fault,” Hahn said. “I was intruding in her territory, and I
had no right to be there.”16 But whatever his “rights” might have
been, Hahn had deliberately chosen to intrude into “her territory,”
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and this just a year after the 1967 deaths had made the risks of doing
so evident. Hahn clearly must have judged the small chance of being
attacked as a reasonable risk to take for the rare opportunity to experi-
ence a beautiful and authentically wild place.
What is less clear is whether Hahn at least in part also considered
the Glacier backcountry a place worth visiting precisely because of
that risk. If he did ascribe at least some value to that risk, the stance at
that point was still somewhat unusual in the region. In 1968, a num-
ber of other Montanans argued that the recent series of attacks
demonstrated that grizzlies were too dangerous and should be annihi-
lated. One newspaper warned that tourists would stop visiting Glacier
and other Montana wild areas if the grizzlies remained. Yet Hahn’s
more tolerant view was even then winning out on a wider national
stage. In a survey of 3,420 people conducted immediately after the
1967 killings in Glacier, the Christian Science Monitor found that only
about 3 percent of respondents favored the elimination of the griz-
zlies.17 Likewise, fears that grizzly attacks would scare off tourists
soon proved unfounded. An examination of the visitor statistics at
Glacier and Yellowstone demonstrates that in the years immediately
after a fatal grizzly bear attack the number of visitors typically in-
creased rather than decreased. Visitation to Glacier, for example,
went up by 9.1 percent in the year following the widely reported
1967 deaths.18 Of course, the visitation numbers at the two parks
were affected by many different variables and have mostly trended
steadily upward over the past fifty years. Nonetheless, these numbers
do raise an intriguing question: to what extent was the danger posed
by a grizzly a key part of an experiential that made Yellowstone and
Glacier world-class destinations worth paying significant amounts of
money to visit?
To be sure, administrators and scientists never deliberately set out
to engineer parks where there was even a remote chance that their
human visitors might be attacked and perhaps eaten. To the contrary,
they sought to avoid violent encounters between humans and bears
in order to better protect both. Nonetheless, as they worked to create
or preserve what they viewed as a more natural or wild population of
grizzlies, they were also willing to accept that these wild bears would
very occasionally harm visitors. Initially, this risk may have
seemed an unfortunate, but not unreasonable, price to pay for pre-
serving and protecting the wild grizzly. Further, the risk could be
minimized through wise management policies and by educating park
visitors on how to avoid bear attacks. Yet, from the start, it also seems
apparent that the danger posed by the wild grizzly bear was often
seen not solely as a liability but, rather, as a vital part of a true north-
ern Rockies wilderness experience. Consider, for example, the words
of Stephen Herrero, one of the leading researchers on bear attacks,
who observed in a 1976 scientific paper that even a small chance of a
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grizzly attack sets the “mood” for any backcountry visit. “It does not
matter if you fail to encounter a grizzly,” he argued. “A partial foot
track set in mud showing claw marks well beyond the toes, or a mas-
sive scat full of partially digested huckleberries, is enough to make
most backcountry travelers feel the presence of the bear.”19 Another
wildlife biologist who had worked in Glacier suggested that the pres-
ence of the potentially dangerous grizzly grants the backcountry ad-
venture much of its appeal: “They make you more alert, make you
more aware and they add a yeast to life—sometimes too much.”20 A
recent report on the Yellowstone grizzlies also stresses how rare, and,
thus, presumably valuable, opportunities to experience such a unique
risk have become. “To many people, grizzly bears symbolize wildness
because they dominate the landscape,” the authors write, and, in do-
ing so, they “remind us of an ancestral world filled with natural dan-
gers and difficulties rarely experienced by most people today.”21 The
authors do not explain precisely why it is worthwhile to be reminded
of those earlier dangers; perhaps its value is assumed to be self-
evident.
The Montana-based nature and science writer David Quammen
captures the essence of this new experiential commodity in a recent
National Geographic article celebrating the centennial of the National
Park Service. Many today treasure a place like Yellowstone, he writes,
because it “is not just a zoo, it’s an authentic wilderness,” a land that
is “painted in blood—the blood of many wild creatures, dying vio-
lently in the natural course of relations with one another, predator
and prey, and occasionally also the blood of humans.” In this place,
“your park entrance receipt won’t protect you. You can be killed and
eaten.”22 Yet Quammen’s largely celebratory article makes clear that,
far from frightening visitors away, this small danger of a grizzly attack
today (slightly greater than that of getting hit by lightning) has be-
come a central element of what attracts visitors from around the
world. Visitors, it might be added, who need hotels, restaurants, and
other conventional commodities as they pursue a most unconven-
tional experiential commodity. While not the primary intent, the en-
gineering of a carefully controlled risk of a bear attack has
nonetheless become surprisingly good for the business of catering to
park tourists. Indeed, in this light, the ubiquitous signs and warnings
about bears, while obviously designed to avoid violent run-ins that
even today often end badly for the bears, also have the positive effect
of heightening the sense of danger that has become a strangely valu-
able commodity.
We might be tempted to conclude that this deliberate courting and
commodification of an experience that had been the epitome of ter-
ror a mere century ago is just another example of the contemporary
obsession with adrenaline pumping thrills. Yet, is there perhaps
something more profound at work here as well? If earlier experiential
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commodifications of the grizzly had sought to allay anxieties about
diminished masculine dominance, or, subsequently, to suggest that
humans and nature might yet find a way to live in harmony, this lat-
est version is uniquely well suited to the anxieties of the
Anthropocene, the supposed Age of Man. Today, at least some of the
visitors to the parks no doubt share the growing fear that humans
might well have become too powerful, that the natural world has
been all but eclipsed by the anthropogenic. To be sure, others of a
more Promethean turn of mind may revel in this idea as the ultimate
expression of the human transcendence of nature.23 Yet, for many,
and perhaps especially those who would elect to hike in grizzly coun-
try, the prospect of a world in which humans have come to entirely
dominate nature is both bleak and frightening. Given such anxieties,
surely there is some reassurance to be found in visiting a place where
a dangerous wild animal still dominates the land—a place where you
can still viscerally sense that there is something greater and more
powerful than us, some enduring remnant of a once untamed, but
now rapidly vanishing, natural world that, we hope, might yet be
able to save us from ourselves. Today, when human domination has
itself become perhaps our greatest danger, there is an odd reassurance
to be had in visiting a place where a powerful predator might still dis-
patch a pathetically defenseless visitor with one swat of her mighty
paw. In this supposed Age of Humans, perhaps the most valuable
commodity we can consume is the chance to feel that it is humans
themselves who might yet be consumed.
Timothy James LeCain is professor of history at Montana State
University in the United States. His most recent book is The Matter of
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Paul J. Lane
Material Desires, Ecological
Anxieties, and East African
Elephant Ivory from a Long-
Term Perspective
The East African littoral has been linked to other parts of the world
via global connections for at least two millennia, and ivory has long
been an important export commodity for certain East African socie-
ties. Through a combination of circumstances during the early deca-
des of the nineteenth century, East Africa’s ivory became both the
most readily available and desirable in Western Europe and North
America, and Zanzibar became the main port of export.1 Several tech-
nical inventions, along with accelerating industrialization and chang-
ing patterns of social distinction, played a critical role, while the
relocation of the sultan of Oman’s court to Zanzibar and the entry of
merchants based in Salem, Massachusetts, into the Indian Ocean
sphere increased the market value of ivory. Customs records, for in-
stance, indicate that the export value of ivory per frasila (approxi-
mately 15.5 kilograms) roughly tripled between the late 1820s and
early 1870s and then almost tripled again over the next twenty
years.2 The volume of ivory exported from Zanzibar also rose mark-
edly in response to rising demand in the metropolitan centers of
Europe and North America. Total ivory imports into the United
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Kingdom between 1790 and 1875, for example, rose from around 125
tons to 670 tons, with the sharpest increase occurring after 1840.3
Not all of this was from East Africa. Some came from other parts of
Africa, and some was even derived from India, although how much
of this was obtained from Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) and how
much was re-exported African elephant is uncertain. Nonetheless, by
the mid-nineteenth century, eastern Africa was the greatest supplier,
with exports being channeled to Britain, mainland Europe, and the
United States via two main redistribution centers, Zanzibar and
Khartoum. The scale of extraction was enormous, and even the more
conservative estimates based on historical trade records suggest that
between 7,000 and 20,000 elephants were being killed each year at
its peak.
ECOLOGICAL ANXIETIES: PAST AND PRESENT
Against this background, it is perhaps no surprise that by the end of
the nineteenth century ecological anxiety had emerged that the
long-term future of African elephants was endangered by escalating
human demand for their tusks. In 1898, for example, the New York
Times carried an article place and date stamped “Antwerp, 28
August,” under the headline “TO SAVE THE ELEPHANTS.” The state-
ment that followed left no doubt as to who the culprits might be:
“The African Animals Nearly All Killed Off by the Ivory Traders—
Their Brutal Massacre.”4 Bradford Colt de Wolf, the journalist who
filed the story, went on to speculate that at the current rate of exploi-
tation elephants were likely to be extinct in the Congo Free State
within ten years and offered trade statistics concerning the weight of
imports to Antwerp during the 1890s to support his argument. He
then outlined the plans to deal with this emerging crisis that had
been developed on behalf of the French National Society of the
Taming of the African Elephant by Paul Bourdaire, head of mission at
the French Ministère des Colonies and “an eminent authority on
African elephants.”5
Although the idea of taming African elephants might today seem
naive, the underlying anxiety expressed by Colt de Wolf has a famil-
iar, contemporary resonance.6 In the late nineteenth century, the le-
gitimate trade in elephant ivory and its escalating consumption in
Western countries, especially by an ever-growing middle class, were
the main focus of concern and blame. By contrast, today’s anxieties
over the long-term future of Africa’s forest and savannah elephants
focus on the impacts of an expanding illegal trade in ivory, the
poaching that feeds this trade, and the corresponding demand at the
other end of the modern ivory commodity chain in China and other
Asian countries.7 Nonetheless, there are a number of similarities
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between the content of these anxieties that derive from shared con-
cerns about the effects of commodification. Both, for example, con-
sider overconsumption to be the ultimate driver of the mass
extirpation of elephants, even if the uses of ivory, the mechanics of
its transformation into desirable objects, and the geographical con-
centration of these desires have changed.
In the late nineteenth century, objects made entirely or partially
from ivory were commonplace in many Western, middle-class house-
holds. As Alexandra Kelly has explored, the use of ivory as a raw mate-
rial was widespread in Victorian-era Britain and the United States
(and, most likely, in other parts of the Western world).8 Ivory was in-
cluded in many fashion accessories and in the manufacture of per-
sonal grooming items ranging from collar studs and hairbrush
handles to vanity sets; as a decorative component of small domestic
furnishings; and for making everyday household items such as sewing
cases, calling cards, toothpicks, and napkin rings. Ivory was also an
important raw material for various professional instruments includ-
ing rulers, medical syringes, and dental tools. The manufacturers of
three items, in particular—piano keys, cutlery handles, and billiard
balls—seem to have been voracious consumers of ivory and, espe-
cially, of ivory from East African savannah elephants, which was val-
ued for its purity of color and greater ease of working over ivory from
other parts of the continent and for its larger size and finer grain rela-
tive to Asian elephant ivory.9
This upsurge in the use of African elephant ivory for everyday items
marked the final stage in its democratization and transformation
from older associations in Western societies with elite culture and the
Christian church, established during the early medieval period, into a
raw material serving mass consumption among a burgeoning middle
class with growing disposable incomes.10 Ivory’s ubiquity in everyday
life was perhaps also a vicarious means of accessing and taming the
wild while, at the same time, keeping Africa’s most powerful of
“unruly beasts” at bay. If popular fiction and travelogues served to
fuel Victorian imaginings of Africa’s untamed jungles and life-
threatening encounters with wild beasts, ivory’s material and tactile
properties—its cool silkiness—allowed for its domestication. The sen-
sory properties of ivory, its malleability and absorbent qualities, and
its simultaneous ability to resist some of the effects of time to which
other materials succumb feature prominently in the descriptions of
encounters with ivory by artisans, musicians, and artists alike.11
These attributes shaped desires for ivory as well as how these desires
in turn gave form to different ivory objects. Importantly, the affective
power of these attributes also changed as they were moved along
their commodity chains. The weight of each tusk, documented in
great detail by the ivory merchants and customs officers in Zanzibar
and drawn upon to measure their economic success, would have had
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different resonances for the porters who carried these tusks on their
backs from far in the interior and also for the artisan sitting at a lathe
or mechanical saw in Sheffield, England, or Ivoryton, Connecticut,
turning each tusk or fragment in their hands, weighing and sensing
its affordances as a raw material.
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, by contrast, the
primary locus of desire for items made from ivory is Asia and, espe-
cially, Mainland China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Vietnam. Unlike in the nineteenth century, consumption and desire
appear to be directed more toward ornately crafted items, which, pre-
cisely because of the high cost of illegally traded ivory, have made fin-
ished ivory objects increasingly less accessible except for the
wealthy.12 In some respects, finished objects made of African ele-
phant ivory may be reverting in these markets to prestige goods
rather than to a readily available commodity, and, in this sense, its
current status bears some comparison to ivory in medieval and early
modern Europe.13 One significant difference, however, is the stock-
piling of ivory in anticipation of future price rises, particularly as the
flow of ivory through both legal and illegal channels is further re-
stricted. According to some recent data, it is this stockpiling that has
been driving ivory prices upwards in the Asian markets.14
BURNING DESIRES
The irony, of course, is that the stockpiling of ivory was also com-
monplace during the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ivory
trade. A well-known photograph probably taken in the early twenti-
eth century of ivory buyers for the Ivoryton piano key manufacturers
Cheney, Comstock, and Company, for instance, shows Arnold
Cheney lounging on a huge pile of tusks outside the company go-
down in Zanzibar.15 There were likely many more tusks inside judg-
ing from Richard Harding Davis’s visit around the same time, when
he was shown twenty-five thousand dollars’ worth of “tusks piled up
as carelessly as though they were logs in a wood-shed” in the corner
of “one little cellar.”16 A more-or-less-contemporary photograph of
the ivory store of Joseph Rodgers and Sons at No. 6 Norfolk Street,
Sheffield, similarly depicts serried ranks of large tusks waiting to be
worked or sold on.17
Financial motives undoubtedly lay behind this accumulation of
ivory, but unlike in Asia today, stockpiled ivory was held largely to
meet current, rather than future, demand by exploiting the affordan-
ces that ivory provided for satisfying Western aesthetic desires and
notions of social distinction. It is intriguing, therefore, that stock-
piled ivory has taken on new meanings and offered up alternative
affordances since the late twentieth century. These are aimed at






/envhis/article/24/4/665/5571066 by guest on 01 July 2021
challenging both the continuing slaughter of Africa’s elephants and
transforming ivory’s status from a “commercial” to a “public” good.
This manifests in at least two ways. The first is through the collection
and curation of found ivory, recovered principally from national
parks and other protected areas by wildlife authorities and held, sup-
posedly indefinitely, in secure storage. Although superficially resem-
bling the vaults holding wildlife collections in natural history
museums around the world (many of which in themselves were first
assembled through the extractive, celebratory activities of big-game
hunters but now are put to work in the name of science and conserva-
tion), these collections remain far more dormant, under lock and key
and out of the public eye.18 The affordances that these piles of ivory
offer may remain latent, but they are no less potent, periodically
stimulating calls for “one-off sales” to generate income for the same
wildlife authorities that collect and curate these tusks, while also of-
fering opportunities for corrupt practices and personal enrichment
on the part of some of their employees and other government
officials.19
Since 1989 and the introduction of an international ban on ivory
sales under the auspices of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), stockpiled ivory
has begun to take on a different kind of affordance, allowing nation
states to enact a new form of competitive, conspicuous consump-
tion.20 This involves the high-profile, public destruction (typically by
burning but also by crushing) of confiscated and legitimately collected
raw and worked ivory. At least thirty-one such events are known to
have occurred in twenty-three different countries, resulting in the de-
struction of approximately 250 metric tons of ivory.21 The largest such
event to date took place, with great fanfare and display of military and
paramilitary force and celebrity endorsement, in Nairobi National Park
on April 30, 2016, resulting in the destruction of over one hundred
metric tons of confiscated ivory valued at around US $220 million.22
To put this in perspective, the eleven pyres of tusks assembled by wild-
life officials, volunteers, and school children from one of Nairobi’s in-
ternational schools probably represented 8,000 dead elephants. In
other words, it was more or less equivalent to the total number of ele-
phants killed in a single year at the height of the nineteenth-century
legitimate trade and, in terms of weight, under one-sixth of the total
tonnage of ivory imported into Britain in 1875 alone.
Intended to symbolize state-level expressions of solidarity with
global conservation campaigns to eradicate poaching and the illicit
international ivory trade, the effectiveness of these events as a conser-
vation tool is far from clear—obscuring, as they do, failings of state
systems for policing and protecting wildlife resources, recurrent alle-
gations of high-level corruption behind the rise in poaching, and in-
adequate responses to address the legitimate concerns of rural
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populations that bear the brunt of human–elephant conflicts in terms
of both physical harm (often resulting in death on both sides) and
impacts on livelihoods from crop destruction. At the same time, the
destruction of the ivory generates atmospheric pollutants and
removes the possibility of investigating through combined isotopic
and DNA analyses the individual life histories of those elephants
whose tusks were destroyed and so generate information critical to
understanding mobility patterns, herd demography, and individual
genealogies, which all have direct value to the conservation programs
these public burnings are intended to reinforce. Burning ivory may
remove it from the commodity chain, but, ultimately, it does not
solve the problem of keeping elephants alive. For this, we need to re-
imagine elephants as “wild sovereigns” with inalienable rights over
their habitats and futures and not simply as convenient bearers of a
renewable resource that humans continue to desire.23
Paul Lane is Jennifer Ward Oppenheimer Professor of the deep history
and archaeology of Africa at the University of Cambridge. He specializes in
the historical ecology, heritage, and archaeology of eastern Africa over ap-
proximately the last five thousand years, with emphasis on the transitions
to food production, landscape domestication, the trade in elephant ivory,
and the archaeology of enslavement and abolition.
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Lorena Cordoba
White Blood, Black Gold: The
Commodification of Wild
Rubber in the Bolivian
Amazon, 1870–1920
The “rubber boom” played a decisive role in the integration of the
Amazon rainforest into the global economy. Between 1870 and 1920,
most Amazonian countries eagerly engaged in the rubber trade: first,
Brazil, accounting for nearly 80–90 percent of the world market, fol-
lowed by Bolivia and Peru, with 5–10 percent, and, finally, by
Colombia and Venezuela, with a lower production.1 This article dis-
cusses the commodification of rubber in Bolivia from 1880 until its
decline in the 1910s. It poses the question of how social perceptions
of rubber as a wild, inexhaustible natural resource grounded, and af-
fected, the structure of its exploitation.
As early as 1867, there were reports about rubber tappers in the
Bolivian Amazon.2 The boom only really set in, however, when
American explorer Edwin Heath discovered the connection between
the Beni and Mamore rivers in 1880, and a new export route was
opened toward the Brazilian ports of Belem do Para and Manaos.
Major firms like Suarez or Braillard opened branches in London and
met the international demand for rubber in Europe and North
America, bringing about a “black gold” fever with rubber tappers
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rapidly spreading along the banks of the main rivers of the region:
Mamore, Beni, Orthon, Acre, Madre de Dios. There were widespread
legends of fortunes made overnight, heaps of pounds sterling and ob-
scene luxuries in the midst of the rainforest:
Rubber barons lit cigars with hundred-dollar bank notes and
slaked the thirst of their horses with silver buckets of chilled
French champagne. Their wives, disdainful of the muddy
waters of the Amazon, sent linens to Portugal to be laun-
dered. . . . The great symbol of excess was the Manaus Opera
House, a monumental Beaux Arts extravaganza designed by
a Portuguese architect and built over a seventeen-year period
ending in 1896.3
The rubber boom propelled the overlooked and obscure Bolivian east
into the national and international imaginary. In addition to mass
migration from across the Andes and Europe, it brought about the
foundation of towns, land grants to private persons by the national
government, the cartographic and scientific exploration of the rain-
forest, the incorporation of hitherto marginal territories into state ad-
ministration, and the redrawing of the country’s boundaries,
concurrently with the concession of vast tracts of land to national
and foreign-owned extractive companies.4
To legitimize the extractive expansion, the rationale of the mod-
ernist discourse in Bolivia came down to three basic postulates. First,
the ideas of progress and civilization were generically attributed to
that economic activity, as opposed to the savagery and wild nature
(naturaleza salvaje), as one notorious rubber tapper put it,5 of the
Amazon rainforest and its inhabitants: “Without rubber this faraway
region would still remain unknown and undisputed; moreover, to-
day, should the rubber industry disappear, any activity, any progress
would die.”6 In the regionalist imaginary of the Bolivian lowlands,
the rubber industry was seen as a driver of national development and
as the successful counterpart to mining, an industry historically asso-
ciated with the Andean highlands.7
Second, the jungle was perceived as a desolate desert open to op-
portunities. The Achilles heel of the industry was the scarcity of labor,
and a mixed workforce had to be consolidated: mestizos, Andean
migrants, foreigners, and also members of indigenous tribes, such as
the Cavine~nos, Araonas, Moje~nos, and so on. Within the rubber labor
system—the so-called habilito—a patron assigned a given territory to
a tapper, where the latter would collect the rubber milk and then
smoke-dry and coagulate it into rubber balls (bolachas). The patron
advanced food, medicine, weapons, tools, and clothes to the tapper,
which the tapper would pay for in rubber, settling part of the debt
and receiving more supplies as advance payment, thus restarting the
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credit cycle.8 Rubber barons had exclusive rights over the purchase of
the rubber and the selling of supplies so that the tappers were trapped
in a vicious circle of debt that was hard to break even for European
workers.9 Contemporary debates were frequently focused on how to
recruit laborers, who sometimes were willingly engaged but other
times forcibly hired.10 Indigenous workers were mainly seen as sup-
porting actors, while the tappers facing heat, malaria, and attacks by
the “savages” were presented as the heroes of civilization. The bottom
line was clear; the natives had to become integrated into the agenda
of progress or else be eliminated.11
Third, and most importantly, there was a notion of the rainforest
as an almost endless source of natural wealth. Indeed, the literature
reveals the extended utopia of an infinite nature. It usually consisted
in a mere enumeration of natural resources; while the Bolivian high-
lands contained gold, silver, tin, and copper, the lowlands offered
rubber, quinine, coca, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, cotton, and sugarcane,
and, among these, rubber was clearly the crucial staple, which no one
thought could ever be exhausted:
Every year several expeditions explore the Beni region, pene-
trate its forests, find new tributaries of rivers, examine the
land and come back with surprising stories of gold mines
and the abundance of precious gemstones, the opulence of
pastures, agricultural valleys and tropical fruits, and, crown-
ing it all, the limitless treasures of rubber, one of the main
products of world commerce.12
In some cases, this discourse of opulence reached quite a romantic
fascination, akin to what William Cronon called “the sacred grandeur
of the sublime.”13 Having spent several years working with rubber in
Bolivia between 1907 and 1922, Swiss rubber tapper Franz Ritz elo-
quently describes this magnificence:
There’s life everywhere—from left to right, up and down ...
images like in One Thousand and One Nights come one after
the other, as if in a film. This tropical splendor is a delight to
the eyes. The air is filled with charming aromas. Beetles and
other strange insects buzz and hum. There is no other place
in the world where vegetation proliferates with such volup-
tuous and unbridled exuberance.14
These postulates, to be sure, reveal a predatory logic in the Bolivian
modernist rhetoric, obsessed with exporting natural resources and in-
tegrating the Amazon rainforest—and, therefore, the whole
country—into the global economy. They also reveal, however, the ca-
nonical consensus about the rainforest being a deserted, wild space,
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teeming with endless resources. Indeed, the Amazon rainforest would
only come to be perceived with anxiety as a fragile, endangered, finite
space toward the very end of the twentieth century, the time both of
its most intense destruction and an emerging global consensus on
the necessity of rainforest conservation.15
The perception of the rainforest as endless in the nineteenth cen-
tury is also evident in discourses about its population. As Cronon
observes, “the myth of the wilderness as ‘virgin’ uninhabited land
had always been especially cruel when seen from the perspective of
the Indians who had once called that land home.”16 Amazonia was,
of course, not deserted, but the indigenous owners of most of the rub-
ber territory were commonly stereotyped as barbarous, savage, or
even cannibals in order to justify land dispossession.17 Indeed, nu-
merous tappers believed that, among the endless resources, figured
the natives themselves, who were as natural as the plants or the ani-
mals; once inside the credit cycle, workers were kept in permanent
debt, and many observers even refer to the habilito system as a sort of
slavery. Debates about labor conditions, involving several social
actors—missionaries versus rubber tappers, caucheros versus siringueros
among tappers, and so on—should in fact be understood along those
lines.18 Ernst Leutenegger, who worked in the famous Casa Suarez
and knew firsthand the Bolivian rubber industry for a whole quarter-
century (1905–30), summarized the issue:
The product collected by dark-skinned, shabby, and skinny
people constituted the source of the gold river that flowed
into the pockets of rubber speculators from Manaos, Para,
New York and London. ... A large part of the indigenous pop-
ulation never returned to their homes. Like the Moloch god,
the jungle swallowed everything.19
There were nuances to the predatory ideology, connected to techni-
cal or botanical features. We speak generically of “rubber,” but, on
the one hand, there was indeed caoutchouc (Castilla elastica or Castilla
ulel) and, on the other, siringa (Hevea brasiliensis or Hevea benthami-
ana), which required very different forms of exploitation, varying in
terms of the modes of extraction and commercialization they re-
quired. Caucheros felled the tree to obtain lower-quality and, hence,
cheaper latex, while tappers made incisions to get finer and more ex-
pensive rubber. The former entailed a more nomadic and destructive
method of extraction, while siringa allowed for a more sedentary, me-
thodical, and less aggressive form of exploitation. Consequently,
some siringueros claimed their cauchero colleagues impersonated a de-
graded and irresponsible version of the extractive endeavor and even
presented siringa as a more ecological industry avant la lettre.20
However, historical sources also show that differences were not
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merely technical. The Amazonian regions, having as much caoutchouc
as rubber, were normally border areas where tensions abounded,
ranging from informal skirmishes (for example, the Jurua and Purus
river basins) to formal wars between states (for example, the Acre War
in 1899–1903 between Bolivia and Brazil). In these contested spaces,
technical divisions were often interpreted in a nationalist key;
Peruvians were described generically as caucheros, while Bolivians or
Brazilians appear as siringueros, when, in fact, it is clear that in most
cases there was cooperation with trade partners going beyond borders
and that the very same traders dealt both with siringa and caoutchouc.
An important source of complexity relates to the sustainable condi-
tion of rubber. As early as 1901, a technical report of the India Rubber
World pointed to the possibility that rubber might become exhausted.
It described the dangers of limiting business to the wild variety and
advocated large-scale cultivation, mentioning the waste of rubber in
defective processes, the inexistence of government regulation, and
the lack of improvement in navigation or railways.21 But this diag-
nostic was not shared in Bolivia. The idea that rubber trees would al-
ways be at hand, never-ending and eternal, indeed allows for a better
understanding of the overwhelming attraction of a merchandise item
that literally “oozed from the trees.”22 On account of a utopian per-
ception that the riches of wild rubber were inexhaustible, neither the
Bolivian government nor the merchant houses seem to have seriously
considered maximizing benefits through the setting up of plantations
and practically no one managed to foresee the looming crisis.
While rubber demand flourished in Brazil and was budding in
Bolivia, botanist Henry Wickham smuggled from Brazil to London
about 70,000 Hevea seeds, which were planted at the Kew Royal
Botanical Gardens and then transplanted to Ceylon. Brazil did noth-
ing to prevent it and neither did Bolivia nor Peru.23 In Peru, it was be-
lieved that wild rubber was of superior quality, that cultivated plants
were more prone to catch diseases, and that Asian workers were less
skilled, though inaction might probably also have been influenced by
the notorious Putumayo scandal.24 In Brazil, it was claimed that rub-
ber trees would never grow in Asia and that if they did they would ei-
ther not yield rubber or only yield rubber of very inferior quality.
When Asian rubber eventually flourished, in excellent form, and also
became less costly due to cheap Asian labor, it was just too late. In
1910, Brazil still produced roughly half of the world’s supply. Within
two years, however, the output of the Far East equaled that of Brazil.
By 1918, these plantations produced more than 80 percent of the
world’s supply of rubber.25 In 1911, the first Rubber Congress
attempted to face the crisis, and, the following year, Brazil issued a
decree contemplating experimental tree plantations and a tax exemp-
tion for importing equipment and the construction of railways, but
the plan was discontinued for lack of funds.26
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Though the Bolivian case was somewhat different, “rubber”
remained a synonym for “wild rubber” from the industrial point of
view. The early warning given by the report of the India Rubber World
was never taken into account. When the value of rubber plunged
from three US dollars to seventy-three cents per pound, the only reac-
tion of large firms like Suarez was to put a halt to shipments and wait
for the price to pick up again.27 At any rate, with its attention focused
on the struggle over borders with Peru in Puerto Maldonado and
Brazil in the Acre region, the government was not in a position to
face the crisis.28 One of the conditions of the armistice with Brazil
was the construction of the Madeira–Mamore railway to transport
rubber toward the Atlantic, but the works were only completed in
1912 when the decline of the industry could no longer be reversed.
The extended perception of rubber as a wild natural resource clearly
also contributed to the blockage of any sustainable project of com-
mercialization. This article has tracked significant variations in the
imaginary of rubber as an engine of socioeconomic growth and inser-
tion in the global economy. However, these discursive nuances were
not sufficient to alter the general structure of the extractive paradigm.
Despite some scattered diagnostics exposing concern about the sus-
tainable potential of rubber exploitation—some of them external to
the local industry, such as the India Rubber World report, and others
within, like the siringueros preoccupation about the excesses of the
cauchero colleagues—the underlying logic of rubber commodification
in Bolivia was characterized by the combination of a predatory instru-
mentalism and a romantic utopia of inexhaustible nature. Thus, the
rubber industry was doomed not only due to the unstoppable Asian
competition but also because of an unfortunate chain of internal cir-
cumstances, among them a kind of ecological hubris.29 Therefore,
rubber changed everything on its way across eastern Bolivia, but it
did so like a summer storm.30 After altering the social, political, sani-
tary, economic, and cultural landscape, rubber only left ghost towns
and old stories of grandeur transmitted by its current inhabitants,
some of whom still longed for the times when their lives revolved
around pounds sterling, gramophones, champagne, the Cachuela
Esperanza theatre, and the “black gold” that flowed from the trees.
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Michael Bollig
The Anxieties, Thrills, and
Gains of Rarity and
Extinction: From Discourses
on Remnant Fauna to the
Globalized Protection and
Marketing of Endangered
Wildlife in Namibia’s “Arid
Eden”
Nambia’s semi-arid northwest, the Kaokoveld, in tourist advertise-
ments nowadays dubbed as “Arid Eden,” has been construed as a last
refuge for threatened species. It is also a place where wildlife, along
with exotic indigenous cultures, is marketed to increasing numbers of
tourists. Only thirty years ago, the region was labeled as a besieged de-
sert, an ecosystem characterized by rampant poaching, extinction,
and degradation, while another thirty years earlier—in the 1920s and
1930s—it had been deemed a threatened, but still bountiful, haven
for endangered species. This contribution seeks to trace the
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ambivalent relation between narratives of rarity, extinction, and sur-
vival and the de- and re-commodification of game. The question
whether game can be commodified and, if so, under what conditions
has long been contested and is still a point of vociferous debates. This
article argues that it is precisely the interlinkage of narratives about
extinction or rarity, on the one hand, and about commodification,
on the other, that constitutes what is framed (and sold) as a last fron-
tier, a wilderness, and an “Arid Eden.”
FROM WILDERNESS TO BESIEGED DESERT
The Kaokoveld was an Eldorado for commercial hunters in the late
nineteenth century.1 In order to safeguard remaining wildlife and to
gain control of transboundary mobility, one of the first activities of
the South African administration in the late 1910s was to ban hunt-
ing by local people and commercial hunters.2 When the South
African administration took hold of northwestern Namibia, anti-
poaching measures were given priority. Cocky Hahn, who adminis-
tered the area as native commissioner from 1923 to 1946, was an
ardent conservationist and tellingly also the chief game warden for
the region.3 Proclamation no. 26 of 1928 declared approximately
two-thirds of the Kaokoveld District as part of Game Reserve no. 2,
which would later become Etosha Park, in order to protect dwindling
wildlife species. In the late 1920s, Hahn turned his attention to the
design of a game sanctuary in the remote northern parts of the
Kaokoveld, which would offer “fine opportunities for tourists and
sportsmen to shoot trophies under special licences and
instructions.”4 Of course, such licenses would have been bought with
the colonial administration and would have added to governmental
revenues. While Hahn aggressively opposed any inclusion of game in
value chains, he was prepared to open this small and controllable
window of commodification. Hahn was very interested in remnant
species and devoted much of his work to protect and conserve game
and what he deemed as authentic African pastoral culture. He saw
both as threatened by the capitalist migrant economy that was begin-
ning to transform north-central Namibia and by poachers operating
from Portuguese Southwest Africa. He saw it as his duty to shelter the
Kaokoveld, its fauna, and its human inhabitants against both for the
benefit of the South African colonial empire and its elites, even if this
meant deprivation and loss of resources to local people.5
While hunting for subsistence purposes was condemned, killing
wildlife for scientific reasons and leisure among white administrators
was permitted. The director of the Kaffrarian Museum at King
Williamstown, South Africa, Guy Chester Shortridge organized two
zoological expeditions into the Kaokoveld in the 1920s on behalf of
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several southern African natural history museums.6 It was the aim of
Shortridge’s expeditions to produce a complete inventory of the
fauna of northwestern Namibia and to assess the status of rare and
remnant species.7 This included the hunting and collecting of animal
specimens, primarily for scientific measurements and museum exhi-
bitions. Shortridge devoted a long chapter to the state of elephants in
South West Africa. Notably, he classified the Kaokoveld’s elephants as
a subspecies of their own (Loxodonta africana zukowskyi) and described
their dwindling numbers.8 From the 1920s to the 1940s, the colonial
administration asserted tight control over major game species—on
the one hand, wildlife was stripped of its monetary value and lost rel-
evance for local foodways; on the other hand, exclusive access to
game for leisure hunting and scientific exploration was given by the
state to its bureaucrats, as a token of acknowledgment and as a non-
monetary benefit.
After World War II, conditions changed dramatically. With the in-
stitution of apartheid and the policies of strict segregation and sepa-
rate development of reserves and later homelands, the future of the
region was seen in livestock ranching. The elitist conservation agenda
of earlier decades was criticized as uneconomic and anti-
development. The de-gazetting of the Kaokoveld as a game reserve in
1970 was a final step in prioritizing agricultural development over
conservation.9 Other steps had been taken before that date; in the
1960s, a large-scale borehole-drilling program was rolled out to in-
crease livestock production and to turn the Kaokoveld into a ranch-
ing landscape. Some wildlife species were now labeled as vermin,
useless animals endangering human welfare. Colonial administrators
in northern Namibia’s native reserves (and, since the 1970s, home-
lands) helped the local population to control vermin with “vermin
traps” being given out on repayment.10 Factually, all game that either
preyed on, or competed with, livestock was regarded with disdain;
even rarity did not count as a reason for being in this environment. A
modernized landscape would conserve game in specifically desig-
nated national parks and would make the most rational use possible
of the remainder of the land. The De la Bat Commission, officially in-
stituted to look into options for game management in South West
Africa’s northern homelands in the late 1960s, established that ele-
phants were causing substantial damage in some northern areas. It
stated that “people and elephants cannot live together” and recom-
mended “that elephant guns should be given to responsible people
on payment.”11 Game was to leave the area, either being violently
eradicated or displaced.
Nature conservation was put back on the agenda in the northern
communal areas in the 1970s. The resurgence of market-based trophy
hunting and the immense increase in tourism in the commercial
ranching areas of Namibia and South Africa in the 1960s, on the one
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hand, and the extremely high rates of poaching in the northern
homelands in the 1970s, on the other, contributed to the re-
evaluation of conservation in northern Namibia’s homelands.
Alarmist reports on the rapid demise of wildlife in northern Namibia
were dispatched throughout the latter part of the 1970s and the
1980s. A report by Fritz Eloff, a Pretoria-based professor of zoology
and member of the Broederbond, suggested that the Kaokoveld’s de-
sert elephants were possibly a subspecies of their own and were most
at risk of becoming extinct.12 The South African Nature Foundation
(South Africa’s World Wildlife Fund [WWF] offshoot), the newly
founded Endangered Wildlife Trust, and the Eugene Marais Chair of
Wildlife Management of the University of Pretoria financed a com-
prehensive study of the elephants of the Kaokoveld, which found
that desert elephants were nearly hunted out by the late 1970s and
black rhino by the early 1980s.13 Garth Owen-Smith, a prominent
Namibian conservationist and founding father of community based
conservation, documents in his memoirs that the poachers of these
days frequently were local administrators, high-ranking South
African politicians, and South African Defense Force army staff, sta-
tioned in the Kaokoveld during Namibia’s war of liberation and not,
as other reports allege, local pastoralists. Furthermore, pot licenses le-
gally allotted white officers sizeable game quotas each year. For a
moderate payment, they were allowed to shoot wildlife for their own
use. The demography of wildlife species also changed due to the
planned removals from the area; about three hundred individuals of
the threatened endemic black-faced impala were captured in a rescue
operation in the early 1970s and relocated to Etosha Park and private
game farms.14
The rapid demise of wildlife in a landscape that had been regarded
as a last refuge of rare game species throughout colonial history irked
the well-established South African elite. Conservation was found to
be an important means by which to circumvent South Africa’s inter-
national political isolation, and conservation successes were anx-
iously broadcasted to the wider world.15 Anton Rupert, the South
African business magnate who cofounded the WWF in the early
1960s, involved himself personally in issues concerning conservation
in the Kaokoveld.16 In 1976, Rupert, as the president of the South
African Nature Foundation, proudly communicated that the prime
minister of South Africa, B. J. Vorster, had commissioned the plan-
ning of the world’s largest conservation area to be established in
northern Namibia.17 This mega-conservation area never came about,
and the region plunged into a period of civil war in the late 1970s.
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“BACK FROM THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION”:
CONSERVATION, QUOTA HUNTING, AND
EMERGING TOURISM MARKETS
After Namibia gained independence in 1990, decentralization
reforms stipulated the devolvement of rights and obligations in natu-
ral resource management to previously disadvantaged rural commu-
nities.18 Earlier plans to provide space for conservation by creating
more game parks were politically unacceptable, and, in the donor
world of the 1990s, they were no longer marketable either.
Conservation had to contribute to rural development, it had to be
participatory, and it had to be economically self-sustaining in the
long run. After 1996, rural communities in Namibia could apply to
the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism for conservancy
status in order to further their claims to game and other natural
resources. Adhering to the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom’s design
principles for common pool resource management, local communi-
ties were encouraged to establish corporate entities with a formalized
membership, a well-defined territory, representative forms of internal
leadership, operational systems of surveillance, and detailed
conservation-oriented management plans.19 In return, conservancies
were allowed to market annually fixed game quotas. These quotas
were regarded as communal property of the newly founded conser-
vancies. Income generated from trophy hunting was intended to mo-
tivate conservancy members to guard game as a valuable resource
that would significantly add to local incomes.20 Within fifteen years,
conservancies covered most of the Kaokoveld’s landscapes, and the
number of tourists and, notably, touristic trophy hunters had multi-
plied. Incomes from trophy hunting and leases to tourist companies
were growing, especially after Botswana’s ban on trophy hunting in
2014.21 At the same time, trend lines clearly showed that the num-
bers for all game species, and also those for elephants and rhinos,
were increasing. Wildlife was also reintroduced into the area in
widely publicized moves. The most spectacular reintroduction pro-
gram was the transfer of seven rhinos from Etosha to the western
Kaokoveld in 2007. Black-faced impalas, a species that had been evac-
uated from the Kaokoveld in the 1970s, was reintroduced to the area
in the 1990s. All conservancies in the Kunene region had received
wildlife utilization quotas by 2015, and some of these were sold to
trophy hunting companies.22 The three trophy-hunting companies
operating in the Kaokoveld brought to the region well-paying tou-
rists, who shot game along pre-ordered lists, collected their trophies,
and made photographs with the kill, while the meat was distributed
to nearby communities. A wide range of game was put on the quota
of conservancies in the Kunene region.23 While rare and emblematic
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species sold quickly and at high prices, other game was not favored
by trophy hunters. Currently, the quota is only fully utilized for sta-
tus species like elephants, lions, or crocodiles. In other cases, it is not
used at all; of some 113 baboons offered on the list in 2012, only six
were actually hunted. The Kaokoveld’s multi-species assemblage of
rare and sometimes not-so-rare animals has been partially commodi-
fied and yields sizeable incomes to a range of tourism entrepreneurs
and rural communities. The lion’s share of incomes, however,
remains with the private sector.24 The unequal and strongly market-
led distribution of gains as well as the more fundamental concerns
over animal rights are nowadays raised against trophy hunting on the
international level. In Namibia, however, conservationists and a ma-
jority of local farmers and pastoralists think that community-based
conservation is only possible, if at all, with trophy hunting. Given in-
creasing game numbers and the consequential increase of human–
wildlife conflicts, it is little wonder why those concerned with conser-
vation in Namibia opt for this way of utilization.
The websites of conservationist non-governmental organizations,
donors, and the respective ministry describe a success story. Game
that had been nearly extinct is claimed to have rebounded, and
market-led conservation is seen as a bulwark against extinction. The
engagement of local communities, public-private partnerships, and
intricate surveillance systems involving local game guards scrutiniz-
ing the area as much as aerial surveys and collaring of animals has ap-
parently provided secure places for wildlife; it is an Arid Eden.25
These optimistic reports are counteracted by very recent news on a
renewed upsurge in poaching and far-reaching plans on mining and
the construction of a large hydroelectric dam.26 Eden may not be so
secure as it seemed only some years ago, so long as it is traded on cap-
italist markets. It may be time to reconsider (1) global obligations for
biodiversity maintenance on the periphery; (2) the close (if
unwanted) linkages between rarity, extinction, and game as com-
modity; and (3) the construed antagonisms between conservation
and pastoral/agricultural smallholder livelihoods. In order to do so,
there is a pertinent need to acknowledge that contemporary and fu-
ture approaches to conservation are built upon, and entangled with,
earlier colonial and postcolonial approaches to the topic; there is no
shortcut to progress—not in development and not in conservation.
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Re-Enchanting the World:
Seahorses’ Magic and the
Global Trade of Affect for
Wildlife
Since the 1990s, incidents of seahorse trafficking have been uncov-
ered in dozens of countries.1 The scale of these activities is global,
with estimates of the volume of global trade varying between 15 and
150 million per year, and the trade network includes countries like
India, where seahorses have been considered a major commodity
since the early 2000s, or Peru, where a full boat containing up to eight
million dried seahorses was intercepted in 2016.2 Seahorses are like-
wise a major object of marine conservationist discourse. Diverse
groups dedicated to the protection of seahorses insist that some of
their subspecies are under direct threat of disappearing in the next
decades on account of their commodification, an interpretation rein-
forced by the observation of a reduction in body size of the seahorses
marketed and by dramatic drops in their observed populations in par-
ticular areas, testified to by fishermen.3 Since 2004, seahorse species
have been listed in Appendix II of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).4
Associations dedicated to their specific protection began to appear in
North America and Europe in the 1990s. In this article, I will enquire
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into the reasons both behind seahorses’ commercial appeal and the
mobilizations for their protection. I will emphasize that the mysteri-
ous aura attributed to seahorses is a common point to all sides with
an interest in them and that the “magic” attributed to wild seahorses
should be considered, as a consequence, as being the focus of both
the trade and the protection of the species.
The widespread availability of seahorses for sale in so many differ-
ent places is linked to the multiplicity of uses that the fascination for
seahorses generates: medical ingredient, barbecue delicacy, aquarium
inhabitant, decorative item, or curiosity. In China, allegedly the
main area of seahorse consumption today, the medical and culinary
use of seahorses is more than a thousand years old.5 But seahorses
have also long been used in the traditional medicines of the
Philippines, Korea, and Japan as well as in those of Latin America,
India, and the Arabic world.6 In Brazil, they are noted among the spe-
cies that receive the most versatile use in traditional medicine.7 The
worldwide fashion of aquarium culture also has an impact on the spe-
cies, though in more limited quantities.8 Finally, seahorses are sold as
a commodity in urban markets and seaside souvenir shops the world
over.9
In many respects, the seahorse trade is typical of globalization
trends in the resource extraction industry in the late modern and
postmodern era. The trade mainly targets impoverished, underdevel-
oped Southern countries with large, barely controlled coastal territo-
ries. From the countries where they are fished, the seahorses flow
mainly in the typical direction—toward the richer countries where
they are consumed. The direction they take depends mainly on
whether they are alive and sold for aquariums or dried and turned
into food, medical powders, or curios.
If the seahorse trade can appear as a largely unbalanced and unsus-
tainable one from the viewpoint of nature conservation associations,
their commerce can be seen as a real economic opportunity for poor,
less-developed, fishing communities. At the same time, this business
also attracts modern companies; seahorse farms sprang up during the
first decade of the twenty-first century in countries like Ireland, New
Zealand, and Australia. Their sales are mostly oriented toward trade
in live seahorses for aquariums, however, and have not met with suc-
cess in the Chinese market for dried seahorses, which are used in tra-
ditional Chinese medicine (TCM).10 This is partly attributed not only
to the fact that the price for farmed animals remains higher than that
for wild seahorses, which are fished in poor countries, but also to the
circumstance that wild animals are commonly perceived to be more
effective medically speaking than farmed ones in the context of
TCM.11 In general, the main reasons why clients choose wild over
farmed animals is their “more credible effect” (36.53 percent), their
being “natural” (8.86 percent), their having “fewer side effects” (7.36
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percent), and their being “more traditional” (2.97 percent).12 The po-
tency attributed to wild animals in the context of TCM does not
mean that they cannot be farmed but simply that farmed animals
come as a second choice, unless the consumers express concern about
their sustainability. Other endangered animal species used as TCM
ingredients, like tigers, are actively farmed in China. Seahorse farms
were organized during the Maoist era, but they disappeared from the
country during the 1980s out of a combination of biological and eco-
nomic difficulties.13 Observations also demonstrate that consumers
pay little to no attention to the actual origin of the consumed ingre-
dients.14 However, they give much importance to their “healthiness,”
a quality that they associate mainly with the notion of the absence of
pollution and, thus, wildness.15
What can explain the level of interest in seahorses? The species pos-
sesses a number of original qualities: they have the reputation of be-
ing monogamous fish with a lifelong pair bond, and they have a very
specific biological reproduction organization in which the male bears
the eggs until delivery.16 Following their specific reproductive mode,
in which the male is described as pregnant, seahorses are attributed
numerous virtues in several traditional medicines, not only concern-
ing fertility and potency but also concerning the treatment of ner-
vous sicknesses. In the context of Chinese medicine, seahorses are
declared to have the capacities of “tonifying kidney and activating
Yang. The former function is essentially related to the regulation of
the urogenital, reproductive, nervous, endocrine, and immune sys-
tems; the latter is said to enhance male’s sexual function.”17 The re-
productive specificity of seahorses, however, is not only a tool of
traditional medicinal repertoires. As Susanne Schmitt has observed,
the marine biologists who attempt to protect seahorses often use it to
justify their choice of species: “The stories that circulate about the
Syngnathid family—sea-horses and pipefish—are shaped and colored
by how they organize care and by how this care is interwoven with
gender: male seahorses become pregnant.”18 The notion that male
seahorses can become pregnant reflects the projection of humans of
their own mammal reproductive mode on a species of fish, whose re-
productive behavior is not really comparable to that of mammals.
However, interestingly, it is the vocabulary that marine biologists
use, thus constructing an imagined link from humans to seahorses,
that revokes the practice they describe at the same time.
More importantly, seahorses have a very peculiar appearance. For
millennia, the shape of this small animal seems to have captured the
symbolic imagination of various societies around the world, who con-
ferred upon it mythical and mystical attributes, sometimes linking it
to their deities. The myths and stories concerning seahorses give
them a significant place in the imagination of the marine world, as
indicated by their nominal association with horses and dragons in
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various traditions and languages, from Ancient Greece to Aboriginal
Australia and in some Native Americans tribes.19 This interest with re-
spect to seahorses, however, is a double-edged sword; it is both what
makes them worth talking about, since accounts of such animals raise
interest and curiosity, and what makes them fascinating, valuable,
and, thus, worth trafficking. Like many other animals or vegetables
used in TCM, the consumption of seahorses is not reducible to their
therapeutic use. They are, above all, a foodstuff considered favorable
to human health and, thus, often consumed without medical pre-
scription. This is linked to the peculiarities of Chinese cuisine, in
which the consumption of rare and out-of-the-way food is given a
particularly high degree of social significance. Kwang-chih Chang
notes that Chinese foods are as much characterized by their diversity
as by the fact that food styles are considered socially distinctive; the
refinement and luxurious character of one’s meals being an essential
indicator of one’s economic level and social class. Eugene Anderson
observes that “the more strange a food, the more power is ascribed to
it.”20 This power is attributed not only to the ingredient itself but also
to those who can access, afford, and consume it. The perceived wild-
ness and rarity of an animal reinforce the distinctive character of its
consumption, even if it remains for the majority of the consumers at
a symbolic level; they do not necessarily expect the animals they con-
sume to really have been taken from the wild. Referring to classical
anthropological terminology, one could speak of this power as being
the “mana” of these culinary ingredients. Those who can consume
them incorporate their power through the act of consumption.
It is not only Chinese gourmets who appreciate the peculiarity of
seahorse’s appearance and wild nature. The marine biologists who try
to save them describe the seahorses as “magic[al]” and “charismatic”
because of their body morphology, scarcity, and forms of reproduc-
tion, and they devote particular attention to them for this very rea-
son.21 The tourists who buy them in souvenir shops or collect their
dead bodies on the beach seem to think similarly. Furthermore, sea-
horses are the only species employed as seafood to have received pro-
tection in the CITES’s classification list. Finally, we know of the
trafficking because it is reported, and the reason for this is certainly
that it is also a good story in journalism. Indeed, wild seahorses focus
attention. To put it simply, there would be neither the consumption
and trade of seahorses nor the media reports concerning them, nor,
indeed, associations dedicated to their protection, without the capac-
ity of seahorses to attract audiences, clients, activists, and money.
Wildlife species under the pressure of commerce, globalization
trends, and rapid environmental degradation number in the hun-
dreds of thousands, but most of them are ignored because they lack
precisely what leads seahorses to be protected as well as commodified:
charisma.22 Under the header “role of the species in the ecosystem,”
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the marine biologist Sarah Foster notes that “seahorses are a group of
charismatic fishes that serve as flagship species for marine conserva-
tion. Little is known, however, regarding their functional role in the
ecosystem.”23 This reference to seahorses as a flagship species is more
than a rhetorical trick since that is the role they are commonly
assigned. The biologist Helen Scales also refers to the seahorse as a
charismatic animal, writing that “seahorses are being used as catalysts
for conservation initiatives; they are being held aloft as poster species
to help muster support for protecting the oceans. They are touch-
stones to remind people of the vulnerable, beautiful creatures that
live there, giving us a reason to care.”24 Their disappearance is also
used as a reminder of the need to protect the earth’s oceans from pol-
lution, as seahorses only survive in clean waters. This dimension is
made explicit by the Canadian marine biologist Amanda Vincent of
the University of British Columbia, who founded Project Seahorse in
1996, and explains her choice of the seahorse as a flagship species to
attract attention to the necessity of protecting a coastal environment
by referencing their popular appeal.25 “Saving seahorses means sav-
ing our seas” is a major slogan of the project. Indeed, as Jamie
Lorimer writes, “affect provides the vital motivating force that impels
people to get involved in conservation” and that “flagship species . . .
are the highly visible icons of conservation that are most likely to
trigger sympathy, awareness, and (most importantly) resources from
rich Western patrons.”26 This animal charisma is not only inherent
but also relational. Working on the cases of dolphins and elephants,
Gregg Mitman analyzed the complex apparatus behind charisma pro-
duction and its close relationship with economic, scientific, media,
and even military interests.27
Considering the case of the seahorse, however, it is important to
note how the charisma of seahorses finds itself within an intricate
network of interests and cultural milieus. Wild seahorses are granted
at the same time the power to attract humans, to cure their many ail-
ments, to demonstrate their social status, and to convince them to
save the oceans. This magic ascribed to them can be acquired by eat-
ing them or by putting them on posters, but it is always a central ele-
ment of the attention they receive, so much more than many other
species. Their visibility in today’s human world, as consumable, ad-
mirable, or protectable animals, translates into our will to reach their
world, imagined as being untouched. Seahorses stand for human
competition for status in their respective societies and reflect the
power of those who can choose to boil, grill, study, or photograph
them. We literally en-“able” them, even if in a passive way, and make
of their innumerable abilities—to save us or the oceans—something
that can be longed for.
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“Seahorses in Traditional Medicines: A Global Overview,” Animals in Traditional
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Thomas Widlok
The World as Garden, Laid in
Value Chains
Debates about the commodification of the wild are not limited to
academic circles or negotiations between specialists in conservation
non-governmental organizations and wildlife ministries. Rather, the
arguments of the debates are echoed and fuelled by cultural imagery
held “on the ground”—for instance, among trophy hunters, tourists,
and local residents of wildlife areas. This contribution includes obser-
vations from ethnographic field research with trophy hunters and
with local hunter-gatherers in southern Africa over the last two years.
While my main goal was to record the interaction between these
groups, I often encountered positions that dealt with the opposition
between conservation and commodification. Some visitors invoked
the image of the wildlife reserves as a remote Garden of Eden, while
others were quite conscious of what they saw as their role in global
value chains. A German hunter visiting Namibia, for instance, told
me it would be best to “attach a price tag to the animals, so they
would be taken care of. The reason why there is overexploitation is
because nature appears to be ‘free.’” A Namibian calling in on the
chat show of the national radio service, by contrast, echoed the posi-
tion of the Namibian government that more animals should be con-
sidered national heritage and not subject to market considerations. I
shall argue in this contribution that it is not only the case that expert
discourse is trickling down to everyday debates, but, conversely, the
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positions held by experts in the field of wildlife conservation and
commodification are also very much shaped, and grounded, by their
own cultural background. Despite the often vicious, and anxious,
controversies between conservationists and market liberalists, I argue
that the dominant groups all share a fairly similar worldview—
namely, one that is predicated on notions of cultivation, domestica-
tion, valorization, and the concept of the wild in the first place. They
distance themselves from earlier colonial and imperialist images that
portray the African bush as a wild beast that has to be put in chains
like King Kong. However, they do invoke a widely shared notion of
the world that is (or should be) a garden and that, at the same time,
cannot escape the logic of value chains—thus, a world as a garden
that is laid in chains.
In what follows, I will be looking in particular at two tropes that
feature prominently in debates about the commodification and con-
servation of the wild: the concepts of gardening—which includes the
establishment of parks, conservancies, wildlife management, and pro-
tected areas—and of “value chains,” a broad understanding of the
economy as made up of discrete steps and transactions whereby value
is added at every step of converting raw materials into products for
sale to the end customer. I propose that both of these tropes carry a
specific cultural bias, which, however, often goes unacknowledged
since both are frequently presented, or at least tacitly accepted, as
instances of human universals, free of any specific cultural baggage,
so to speak. I argue that these tropes are (anthropologically speaking)
far from covering the whole spectrum of ways of dealing with the ani-
mals and plants that are commonly classified as wild. By contrast,
commodification and conservation are in many ways complementary
antinomies. It is possible to fundamentally widen the spectrum, and
broaden our perspective, by incorporating research with hunter-
gatherers who have so far had less impact on the terms of the domi-
nant political and scholarly debates.
CONSERVATION AND COMMODIFICATION AS
COMPLEMENTARY ANTINOMIES
My first proposition is that the main strategies for trying to over-
come the opposition between commodification and conservation
consist in seeking to eliminate one at the cost of the other. As indi-
cated above, for many commercial hunters, there is no contradiction
between commodifying and conserving nature since commodifica-
tion would encompass conservation. To them, it is the lack of
commodification—the failure to put a price tag onto natural
resources—that creates problems of overexploitation. The comple-
mentary position is that of denying the antinomy by expanding
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conservation. This strategy is prominent not only in Botswana but
also in other parts of southern Africa. State wildlife conservationists
in Namibia, for instance, seek to keep certain species such as rhino
entirely out of the market. Unlike most other animals that can be
owned by commercial farmers—and which, accordingly, can be shot
and sold—rhinos are declared to belong exclusively to the nation-
state so that they cannot be owned and commercially transacted by
anyone else. Here, conservation is sought by insulating its object
from the market and commodification. Although states, organiza-
tions, and individuals may differ with regard to which animals should
be used commercially or should be exempted by conservation (or
what the appropriate quotas and protections should be), the disput-
ing parties see their main strategy as one of shifting the boundaries
toward one of the two poles that constitute the antinomy. In other
words, they effectively aim to shift species, or sections of certain spe-
cies in specific times and places, across the boundary that has been
established between the domesticated (commercialized) and the non-
domesticated and wild (non-commercialized). They all accept that
this is the all-encompassing dividing line, and they define their own
position by negation of the opposing view. However, once we accept
that the distinction of domesticated versus wild is neither universally
held nor applicable, then the boundary between commercialized and
non-commercialized also becomes less firm.
Anthropological theory has tried to capture the political debates
around commodification in terms of the processual character of how
things become commodified. According to the social life of things po-
sition, commodities are not certain types of things but, rather, any
thing can become commodified since, according to Arjun Appadurai,
“the commodity situation in the social life of any ‘thing’ [is] defined
as the situation in which its exchangeability (past, present or future)
for some other thing is its socially relevant feature.”1 The social coun-
termovement to commodification is that of “singularization”—that
is, the process of making things incommensurable and not fit for ex-
change for money or other items with a calculable value attached.
Hence, things can move in or out of a commodity situation. In the
political debate about which things can or cannot (should or should
not) be commodified, environmentalists claim to be breaking with a
rationalistic modernity that strives toward ever-greater commodifica-
tion. Moreover, environmentalists and conservationists are being rec-
ognized (also by their adversaries) as breaking with modernity in this
regard. However, as Vassos Argyrou has shown, environmentalists
continue the modernist project in many ways—in particular, through
a stance of distancing.2
Commodifying is a universalizing move, allowing for things to be
measured against a single standard and to be exchanged against one
another. Take the example of land; the loss of one piece of land,
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however rich in resources, can be compensated by another piece of
land because there is a standard, established from a point of equidis-
tance to all land, for assessing amongst other things the carrying ca-
pacity or the biodiversity of one piece of land compared to another.
Conservationists who oppose commercialization are typically no less
universalizing in their arguments. When protecting the land or spe-
cies by singularizing, taking them out of commercialized transac-
tions, the protection is typically applied universally. With regard to
land, the prohibition to use the land has for a long time been applied
to everyone in a “parks without people” policy.3 In these, and other,
cases, the basis for the singularizing move are based on establishing
and enforcing international standards derived from universal goals
(of resource protection, biodiversity maintenance, carbon dioxide re-
duction, and so on) that are universally applied from a distal position
“from nowhere in particular.” As Argyrou has pointed out, the envi-
ronmentalist justification for preserving land—for excluding it from
commodity markets by making it non-alienable—makes reference to
a universal humanity, which is often glossed in terms of “future gen-
erations” or “for the planet” or “as a biodiversity heritage.”4 This,
too, is a logic of distancing since the damage done to nature through
commodification is presented as a damage done to humanity or some
other abstract category such as the nation or the public. In this analy-
sis, the advocates of commodification and those pushing toward con-
servation are in conflict with one another, but they are both caught
in the same paradigm, and they ultimately share a position of
distance.
THE WORLD AS GARDEN
The commonalities between commodification and conservation
stances also emerge when they are set in opposition to the particular-
ist claims of indigenous people. In Namibia, the recent land claim by
the Hai//om San who filed a lawsuit in order to re-appropriate Etosha
National Park as their rightful land was met by opposition from both
commodification advocates and conservationists who currently use
this land. The privileged and exclusive usage of this land by particular
people was seen as problematic. This echoes the situation elsewhere
when indigenous people claim particular rights to particular stretches
of land or seek to use the land in ways that benefits them but is argu-
ably detrimental to the environment (or to the interest and income
of the wider public). The particularist demand meets the opposition
of both commodification/market advocates and of environmental-
ists/deep ecologists. Their particular interests and perspectives are
interpreted as singular interests that violate against the premises of
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universal markets as well as against universal notions of global envi-
ronmental protection.
A number of explanations have been put forward why commodifi-
cation and environmentalism share common ground in this way.
Hugh Brody has pointed out that we are ultimately dealing with an
underlying “horticulturalist bias” or a “culture of gardening” that has
become dominant in global history.5 This bias can be traced back to
the worldview of the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam, the religions of the axial age that have given rise to a
“gardening ideology” that is dominant at present. While Brody may
have overstated the distinction and underestimated the in-between
positions, a similar bias has found its way into the dominant concept
of culture. The old European culture concept that is derived from the
Latin notion of “colere” (to cultivate / to nurse) also informs the domi-
nant concept of economy that is derived from the Greek oikos (house)
and nomos (rule)—the management of the house—and a theory of
value as that which facilitates the accumulation of goods in house-
based societies.6 Other types of cultural activity—in the sense of
learned, trans-generational patterns of behavior—that do not fit the
cultivating/householding image, Brody and others argue, continue to
be marginalized, excluded, or made invisible. Examples are the dis-
tinction between the “productive” work of agriculture that is con-
trasted with the “appropriation of nature” by hunter-gatherers,
between Kulturlandschaft and Naturlandschaft, between culture and
nature, and between domesticated resources and the wild. In
Namibia, these dichotomies are not simply ideological but are also
put into practice in politics and interethnic relations.
Horticulturalists and their descendants who dominate today’s politics
refuse to recognize hunting and gathering as a legitimate form of
land use, and they insist that certain types of houses have to be built,
that certain types of enclosures must be created, and that fields are
ploughed and homesteads are maintained in a certain way. The most
telling example is that in all regions where there is little gardening,
there is a strong alliance of local politicians and international donors
to create gardening projects, despite a long record of failed gardening
projects among the San in Namibia. There are, therefore, practices in
place that maintain the dichotomy even though it is beginning to
soften (again) in other regions of the world, for instance, as more
stretches of land are purposefully left fallow or as areas of previous in-
tensive use are left to processes of “rewildering.”
When looking for alternatives to these antinomies and dichoto-
mies, it is therefore useful to look at cultural traditions beyond horti-
culturalism and the circle of traditions predicated on an ideology of
the world as garden. In Namibia, alternative views are cultivated by
various San groups. When conducting a free listings and sorting task
with 6¼Akhoe Hai//om, for instance, I found that the categories for
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animals (xamanin) and plants (hain) included both those that horti-
culturalists, and their scientific descendants, would categorize as do-
mesticated and those that they would call wild.7 Similarly, wild
versus domesticated was no relevant distinction when the 6¼Akhoe
Hai//om categorized their environment (glossed as 6¼namibeb or ! ha!
hais) because no categorical distinction is made between the built en-
vironment (huts, fire places) and features of the natural environment
(hills, dunes, riverbeds). This is echoed among hunter-gatherer peo-
ple elsewhere. The Batek in the rainforests of the Malaysian penin-
sula, for instance, do not support the divide between nature and
culture that Philippe Descola discussed for South American horticul-
turalists.8 By contrast, they make other distinctions, for instance, be-
tween all of the inhabitants (human and non-human) of the forest
and those who behave like outsiders.9 Moreover, many of these dis-
tinctions are not categorical, in the sense of being independent of ac-
tion, but they depend on how human and non-human entities
behave and how they relate to one another.
We are therefore not just dealing with different categorizations but,
more fundamentally, with different ways of establishing categories in
the first place. Instead of categorizing all lions as wild and all dogs as
domesticated, hunter-gatherers tend to conceive of particular animals
in terms of their specific knowledge that is built up and continually
updated, for instance, in the course of a hunt, in the course of a life-
time, and as embodied across generations.10 The horticulturalist bias
in conceptualizing the environment, by contrast, is focused on out-
comes, prototypically the point in time when the harvest is brought
in. What counts is what can be counted, as species saved or profits
made. The earlier discussions on commodification and conservation
are, to borrow Andrew Abbott’s words, all about “where it ends up”
instead of “the commitment to the getting there.”11 This is most pro-
nounced in the notion of value chains, which is offered as a way of
thinking about the commodification of the wild.
LAID IN VALUE CHAINS
There are a number of anthropological objections to the notion of
value chains that has become prevalent in geography as a discipline
and in the analysis of commodification more specifically. One point
of critique is that value chains are based on a rather limited horticul-
turalist notion of culture, as hinted at above. Cultivation here is
solely seen in terms of an improvement. Whether one is dealing with
objects or skills, there is a bias toward assuming that domestication
and integration into commodity chains necessarily adds value. This
turns a blind eye toward processes of “cultivating towards the neg-
ative.”12 Just as any learned or trained behavior can improve skill, it
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can also entrench problematic or harmful practices. Value chains,
one could argue, are therefore not necessarily increasing and adding
value, but they can also do harm and decrease value. Moreover, these
negative effects may be highly relevant and important independently
of what is assumed to be the outcome of a complex commodification
process, be it the generation of energy or the extraction of substances.
Here, the horticulturalist balancing of accounts (lateral damages for
the higher good) often conflicts with the resistance of indigenous for-
agers against projects that do certain harm in the process.
A second line of reasoning objects to the notion of a chain in the
first place and its usefulness for describing non-mechanical life pro-
cesses. As Tim Ingold has pointed out, the idea that items are
“enchained” but stay unaltered through their connection may work
for some mechanical linkages but not for processes of life that consist
of continuous lines and relations of growth over time.13 He proposes
the image of a “meshwork” as an alternative to that of linkages and
chains that ultimately reflect a mechanical worldview that is inappro-
priate for the living world. This applies not only to the relation be-
tween living organisms but also, more generally, to the way that
agents and things are enmeshed. For instance, bringing together cer-
tain nuts and certain stones for habitually cracking these nuts creates
traces on the tools that the process of joining things in repeated prac-
tice leaves; these will, in turn, create certain affordances for future
connections.14 Stones that are held in the hand become increasingly
smooth, while stones that hold nuts do not. The effects of being joint
in a certain sequence, for instance, when assembling a bow-and-
arrow set is something that is left out of sight when thinking of the
living world as made up of chain links that can be rearranged and
replaced as the mechanical imagery suggests.15 Despite genetic engi-
neering and wildlife management plans, animal species are not as eas-
ily or repeatedly removed or inserted into a complex living world as
links may be taken in or out of a chain because they have their partic-
ular historical imprint on the environment.
I want to conclude this contribution by adding another critique of
the value chain approach. Hunter-gatherers typically do not see
themselves as the original creators but, rather, see things as pre-given,
as enabled or inhibited by a countless number of other agents, some
human, others not.16 The connecting lines are established not just
through objects that tie people together but also inversely, the lines
between people can determine whether and how objects move and,
more importantly, how they are evaluated. Concretely speaking,
whether an animal (species) makes itself at home on my particular
piece of land or not depends on a long string of enabling or disabling
agents. Human connections across places are an important factor in
this, but they are not the only one. Moreover, the evaluation is
tensed—that is to say, it depends on prospect, moment, and
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retrospect—time in the sense of the right time for something particu-
lar to be done by someone particular—which the notion of value
chains does not entertain.17 The social theory of outcomes is com-
plex, but the dominant view that we find in value chain approaches
is, in Abbott’s words, “thoroughly and completely bourgeois” in that
it prioritizes outcomes to begin with or, as I would put it, premised
on the world of the horticulturalist who calculates his harvest.18
Whether this outcome as harvest is calculated in terms of market
gains (as among advocates of commercialization) or in terms of value
reserved for future generations or humanity at large (as among many
conservationists) is currently the main dividing line in many debates
surrounding the commodification of the wild, in both specialist and
popular arenas. Including the perspective of hunter-gatherers allows
us to broaden the spectrum by going beyond the point at which these
two options have been set up in the first place. Instead of focusing
only on outcomes, such as the number of wild animals counted on a
national territory, the way of getting there—namely, the process by
which outcomes are expected or hoped for—takes center stage. This
includes a recognition of the particular value that particular species
may have in particular places and for particular people.
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Alexander Aisher
Extending Perspectivism to
India’s “Last Wild Place”:
Hunting, Conservation, and
Wildlife, and Its Flourishing
and Decline, in the Eastern
Himalayas
For conservation organizations to work effectively alongside indig-
enous groups in different settings across the planet, their distinctive
ways of knowing and valuing the wild—and borders with it—require
translation. Perspectives need to be exchanged. For hunters of indige-
nous groups like the Nyishi in the Eastern Himalayas, wildlife is wild
by virtue of a living phenomenal and physical border with spirits. If
wild animals are locally protected or conserved, this is not because
they have intrinsic value, so much as up-framed value. This is some-
thing they acquire vicariously, through their spirit owners. Here, and
perhaps only here, we encounter values at the heart of conservation
(in theory, if not always in practice): stewardship, protection, pre-
ciousness, care, and a sense of human limits.
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The notion of wilderness, and its cousin concept wildlife, has a
unique place in the history of conservation. Few notions have exerted
greater influence upon the modern Western imagination of ideal na-
ture and the destructive impacts of humanity upon it.1 Over recent
decades, the ideal of protecting areas of wilderness from human en-
croachment has been a powerful force driving the establishment of
protected areas across the planet—arguably, one of the conservation
movement’s greatest successes. Yet, in the twenty-first century, wil-
derness as “a guiding light for conservation” has come under sus-
tained scrutiny.2 Often conceived as a purified domain of nature,
many modern notions of wilderness tend to “negate long histories of
association between people and places,” conceptually excluding peo-
ple from nature thus conceived.3 This can have potentially devastat-
ing impacts on (often already vulnerable) populations upon whom
conservation relies.
Responding to this conceptual danger, this article seeks to clarify
how upland hunters of the Nyishi tribe in the Eastern Himalayas con-
ceive of areas of the landscape analogous to modern Western notions
of wilderness—areas that hunters call uyu-nyoku (spirit land). In this
mountainous and inaccessible ecological bridge between South and
Southeast Asia, we encounter an indigenous formulation of wilder-
ness that is, in some senses, counterintuitive; while numerous
anthropologists have suggested that Western notions of nature differ
profoundly from those of traditional or indigenous societies, this arti-
cle seeks to correct this notion and urges us not to essentialize
notions of nature. In the central uplands of Arunachal Pradesh, we
encounter notions of wilderness that differ profoundly from modern
Western analogs but that also resonate with notions of bounded and
regulated protected areas, which are central to modern conservation.
PERSPECTIVISM IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS
The indigenous theory (or aesthetic) known as perspectivism has
exerted a profound influence on anthropology. Documented ethno-
graphically in indigenous contexts across South America, the Pacific
Northwest Coast of America, Siberia and Mongolia, and some parts of
Southeast Asia, perspectivism cosmologically unfolds two central in-
terrelated claims: first, the way humans perceive animals and other
subjectivities that inhabit the world differs profoundly from the way
these beings perceive humans and themselves and, second, different
species or kinds may understand the same events in which both par-
ticipate in radically different ways. Through a perspectivist ideal of
knowledge, to know is to “take on the point of view of that which
must be known”—to decenter the human perspective and see from
the Other’s point of view.4
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However, it does not follow that the perspectivist aesthetic neces-
sarily entails empathic or horizontal relations between humans and
animals. In a perspectivist mode, hunters may seek to access wildlife
by understanding how “different kinds of beings represent and are
represented by other kinds of beings.”5 However, in drawing closer to
the perspective(s) of animals’ spirit owners, “hypostases of the animal
species with which they are associated,” they also enter a distinctively
hierarchical universe.6 To access “forms of the forest that concentrate
wealth,” hunters must up-frame their perception of the landscape;
they must view animals “from the privileged (and objectifying)
perspective” of their powerful spirit owners.7 Significantly, this can
trigger a reversal, and redistribution, through the landscape of
Figure 1 The nyoying hunting ritual: six stills from the filmed ritual. Credit: Images produced by author.






/envhis/article/24/4/665/5571066 by guest on 01 July 2021
entities usually considered (from a human perspective) wild or do-
mestic; from the higher perspective of their spirit owners, wild ani-
mals are really domesticates.8
To date, few ethnographers have worked in Arunachal Pradesh, and
of those who have, none have described indigenous knowledge in
perspectivist terms. Yet this is precisely what we find here. During my
first months of first fieldwork in upland Arunachal Pradesh in the
early 2000s, a perspectivist aesthetic was evident in comments by the
Nyishi respondents, such as “night is when humans sleep and spirits
hunt” and “the souls of the dead look up to the sky where we humans
live.”
Deeper enquiry revealed this perspectivist aesthetic informed the
upland Nyishi framing of shifting cultivation, the heart of their sub-
sistence economy, the seasons in which it is embedded, and associ-
ated seasonal migrations of wildlife. As villagers understand it, there
exists a powerful master spirit called Dulu-Kungu Dojung, synony-
mous with the mountain itself, who, from his vantage point high in
the mountains, views human women as they harvest rice. He watches
them shake the final grains of rice from their drying mats, their final
action upon completing the harvest, and (mis-) interprets this as a
challenge. Pridefully, Dojung responds by displaying his own wealth
of “snow-grain,” which gathers at this time of year high in the hills
and mountains above human villages. This snowfall triggers, in turn,
a large-scale migration of wildlife (his animal wealth), including wild
boar and several species of jungle rodent, jungle fowl, and deer, down
through the high temperate forests to lower elevations, which hunt-
ers gratefully appropriate during this more restful period of the year.9
To acquire forest meat (nyoru-ading), Nyishi hunters employ a range
of trapping techniques and devices, which they lay in different areas
of the forest. But hunters do not extract wild animals from nature (a
concept that has no Nyishi equivalent); their transfer into the human
domain occurs instead through social—historically and politically
active—forms of exchange between humans and non-human entities.
The hunting ritual Nyishi hunters call nyoying-amchok offers linguistic
clues to what this exchange of wildlife means. The chant is permeated
with verbs, nouns, prefixes, and suffixes that frame wildlife as the ani-
mal wealth of master spirits and hunting as a dispossession of such
animal wealth.10 Through an animal husbandry imaginary, ritual
gifts of unhusked rice grain and chicken feathers, products of the hu-
man oikos, serve as compensatory gifts to master spirits, offered in ex-
change for their labor of rearing, protecting, and, ultimately,
releasing these animals.
However, exchange of this sort generates genuine anxiety among
hunters, their families, and fellow villagers. Faced with human appro-
priation of their wealth, powerful master spirits are quick to feel jeal-
ousy, anger, and other dangerous emotions. As villagers say, hunters
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tend to live short lives; in the end, master spirits take their share of
human wealth: (domestic) animals, family members, or, in severe
cases, entire longhouses or villages, through soul abductions, land-
slides, storms, or floods.11 Given such threats to human wealth, it is
unsurprising that when performing nyoying-amchok, hunters repeat-
edly urge master spirits to voluntarily release their animal wealth
(figure 1).
Chanting beside the altar, the hunter up-frames his address by in-
voking numerous male and female spirit owners of animals: those
who dwell in mountain peaks, mountain lakes, spirit trees, boulders,
rocky slopes, caves; those who inhabit hard-to-access snowy wastes
and mountaintop scrublands high above the human village; those
who dwell in temperate, subtropical, and tropical forests closer to the
human village; spirit caretakers of village lands; and tutelary ancestor
spirits of past hunters, upon whom accomplished hunters rely. The
plurality and diversity of the more-than-human perspectives that
the hunter calls forth reflects the heterogeneity of the landscape itself
and its generative capacity. Chanting nyoying-amchok, the hunter
positions himself, and his hunting practice, in this dense field of
(social-)ecological relations.
In this “forest of mirrors,” domestic and wild shimmer and are
redistributed throughout the landscape.12 From the perspective of
spirit owners, wild boar are their pigs, jungle fowl are their chickens,
deer are their goats, and goral are their jungle oxen, and in the forests
where they dwell, these (wild) animals wander through (domestic)
spirit villages, reared and looked over by master spirits. As the hunter
chants, from the perspective of their spirit owners, he is a “pig that
has returned to the forest”; he is the “human bear.”
The hunter’s gift of unhusked rice grain and feathers is premised on
something deeper and more fundamental: an exchange of perspec-
tives. Repeatedly, he urges master spirits to see from his point of
view, just as he sees from theirs (he says): to “face and receive” with
“open hands” the rope bridge he ritually invokes and casts from his
human bank of a river-like divide. Bridges span rivers, connecting
spaces, initiating new social and physical mobilities and flows. If ex-
change can be achieved in the present tense of the ritual, the hunter
feels sure that a kill will follow later in the forest.
RELATING TO THE WILD
The term “wilderness” originates in the Old Gothonic term for
“self-willed land.” Likewise, “wildlife” has its root in wildeor (will of
the animal).13 But words lose senses and gain others over time. In
line with William Cronon’s characterization of the modern wilder-
ness concept, spirit land is not land subjected to human will; it too is
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a place where “symbolically at least, we try to withhold our power to
dominate.”14 Yet, for the analyst (if not for Nyishi themselves), this
wilderness is also, like Cronon’s portrait of modern wilderness, a dis-
tinctively human creation. The chant is replete with images of
animal-rearing householders inhabiting unseen villages. However,
unlike Cronon’s depiction of modern wilderness, spirit land thus con-
ceived is not arrogated to humans—spirit land is a space of more-
than-human surveillance, suffused with the capillary power of un-
seen agents. (For this reason, when travelling through spirit land,
hunters employ an alternative vocabulary and are careful to tread
softly, so as not to “surprise” spirits.) Echoing romantic notions of
the sublime, “the supernatural [lies] just beneath the surface” in this
landscape.15
Cronon argues that “the convergence of wilderness values with
concerns about biological diversity and endangered species has
helped produce a deep fascination for remote ecosystems, where it is
easier to imagine that nature might somehow be ‘left alone’ to flour-
ish by its own pristine devices.”16 However, is this really a distinc-
tively modern or distinctively Western conception? After all, this is
precisely how Nyishi view spirit land. It may not be “left alone,” but
its otherness from the human domain—performed through restric-
tions on human behavior whilst travelling through such areas, the
extreme care hunters take not to surprise spirits, and notions of re-
venge for human misdemeanors—is woven into its symbolic texture.
For Cronon, the modern wilderness concept “distances us too much
from the very things it teaches us to value” and leaves “precisely no-
where for human beings actually to make their living from the
land.”17 Through a Nyishi perspectivist lens, this is precisely the
point. Spirit land privileges some areas of the landscape and some
species at the expense of others and distances people from these
things of value.
For Nyishi also, the flourishing of spirit land is premised upon its
otherness. As the hunter repeatedly affirms, he has maintained the
border. This border shares its origin, mythologically, with the agrar-
ian economy itself. As villagers recount, when the first human being
Abu-Tani married the youngest daughter of the Sun, she migrated
with him, in patrilocal fashion, into the human realm. Across the
land, she processed, scattering rice and millet and “human” grain.
Nyishi frame this civilizational event, not as a “Fall” (which Cronon
discerns in the historical emergence of the modern wilderness con-
cept) but, rather, as an accomplishment. However, this new human
presence triggered the jealousy of spirits, including Dojung. To pla-
cate him, the daughter of the Sun offered a compensatory gift of tree
brides—“houses” for Dojung spirits—which she also scattered across
human lands: fig trees (Ficus religiosa), which villagers identify as
spirit trees (uyu-sangney). The upper extent of the growth of these
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trees marks the terminus of human-owned lands and the human
agrarian economy. Beyond this point, all land is spirit land.
This border with the wild arises, in fact, out of a deep existential
threat—the danger of being consumed by angry, disenfranchised
spirit owners. The border with the wild, we could say, arises as a solu-
tion to the problem of human presence in a more-than-human world.
It recognizes, implicitly, the destructive power of humans. It is also a
surveilling border that villagers challenge, deeply lament, and, at
times, seek to dismantle, by ritually felling spirit trees. Often, how-
ever, history asserts itself; oracles indicate that such actions will elicit
spirit revenge and that spirits will hold on to their land—wilderness
remains wild. But, at other times, it does not. As some hunters chant
(in effect): “I have honoured and maintained our border: now ex-
change your wealth with me.”
RIVERS AND CROSSINGS: CONSERVATION AND
PERSPECTIVISM
Over recent years, the human population of Arunachal Pradesh has
increased rapidly. Roads, the cash economy, and associated commod-
ity chains have extended ever further into remote forest spaces. This
comes at a time of numerous new botanical and zoological discover-
ies and the arrival of international conservation organizations seek-
ing to preserve wildlife here in “one of the last biological frontiers of
Asia.”18
The work of conservation organizations in this biologically diverse
and ecologically fragile region is important and necessary. However,
at another level, the new scientific, cosmopolitan, naturalistic lan-
guage of conservation can trigger its own parallel proto-commodifica-
tion of wildlife.19 This can happen when organizations classify
animal species, even entire landscapes, by indexing them to an objec-
tive and autonomous domain of nature, purified of the messy social-
ecological hybridity that permeates indigenous folk classification—a
process that can unwittingly export the “properties of transportabil-
ity, depersonalization, and context independence into the yet-to-be-
commodified world.”20 A sort of conceptual colonization can occur,
as embodied place-based forms of knowledge, rich with complex hu-
man and more-than-human synergies, mutualisms, and ecological
interdependencies, are displaced or ignored. What is lost? Precisely
the sort of “emergent real” that includes spirit owners of wildlife,
spirit lands, and spirit trees. The embodied, storied, performed, felt,
and imagined border with the wild disappears from view, undercut-
ting the ecological reality that biologically rich places are “rich in
relationships as well as in species.”21
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